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I. INTRODUCTION
In Jacksonville, Florida, a city official complains that contractors "low
bid contracts only to pile up thousands of dollars in change orders later."'
In Honolulu, Hawaii,. a city council member grills a city planner as to
how a fixed-price contract for simple renovations to a Waikiki fountain
doubled from the original award.2 The planner sheepishly explains the
water table was higher than expected, and the council member throws up
her hands in exasperation.' In Buffalo, New York, a public works
commissioner reports that overall, road projects average fourteen percent
over budget and "questions whether low bidders deliver the most
inexpensive work."4 There is no disputing that fixed-price government
construction contracts frequently run well over budget.5 A mischievous
clause, found in most government contracts, called the differing site
condition provision, is a principal reason behind the additional costs.
This clause undermines the concept of a fixed-price contract. It leaves
a jaded, cynical public shaking its head as government owners pay for
costs associated with unforeseen conditions discovered during contract
* Assistant Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at
Manoa.
1. See Martin Wisckol, City Eyes Change to Low-Bid Rule, FLA. TIMES-UNION, May 21,
1996, at BI.
2. See Budget Committee, City Council, City and County of Honolulu, Minutes, at 7 (Feb.
26, 1997) (noting discussion for the record) (video archived with City Council, City and County of
Honolulu).
3. See id.
4. See Margaret Hammersley, Overruns on Highway, Bridge Projects Cost County $9 Million
During 1988-93, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 15, 1994, at Local 5.
5. See, e.g., R.B. Brenner, A Dream Is Set in Concrete, Foundation Being Poured for City
Convention Center, SAN DIEGO UNON-TRIB., May 5, 1987, at BI (discussing excavator's changed
condition claim of $10.9 million); Scott McKeen, Firm Seeks $12M More for Dam Job; Says
'Changed Conditions' Helped Boost Cost of Oldman Work, EDMONTON J. (Canada), Apr. 5, 1990,
at A7; Barry Noreen, Mediator May Be Asked to Settle Dispute Between City, Contractor/Cost,
Delays Affect 3.3-Mile Water Tunnel, COLO. SPRINGS GAZErrE TELEGRAPH, June 30, 1989, at B3;
David Willman, Mistakes, Problems Add Millions to Subway Cost Metro Rail: The Red Line Is
Running About $200 Million over Budget. It May Be Costliest Such Project in US., L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1993, at 1.
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performance. While the average person might think that the problem of
cost overruns is unique to the government, little does he or she know that
the differing site condition provision is found in standard form construc-
tion contracts throughout the industry. In fact, as a result of this often
litigated clause, average individuals may find their simple home
renovation or construction project costs escalating beyond the fixed price
stipulated in their contracts.
Such examples are typical in construction projects, which, by their very
nature, are plagued by unforeseen circumstances. Construction contract
documents generally reflect a conscious effort to anticipate the unexpect-
ed and to allocate the risk so the project can go forward. The differing
site condition provision serves that goal by reallocating risk to owners
and by requiring owners to modify contracts during performance to
account for changing circumstances.6 The provision represents a reasoned
and deliberate risk- allocation decision by the federal government."
However, the federal government has also imposed the clause upon states
and municipalities receiving federal money for construction projects.'
The roots of this provision rest in federal procurement law; however,
similar provisions are now the stock and trade of fixed-price construction
contracts.9
In Part II, this Article reviews both the common law treatment of risks
associated with differing site conditions discovered mid-performance and
the rationale for placing all such risks on contractors. Part III examines
6. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
8. See 40 C.F.R. § 35.938-8 & app. C-2 (1996); see also Municipality of Anchorage v. Frank
Coluccio Constr. Co., 826 P.2d 316, 318 (Alaska 1992) (stating that a municipality receiving federal
funding was required to include differing site condition provision); City of Morton v. Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency, 437 N.W.2d 741, 743 (Minn. App. 1989) ("The federal regulations
establish minimum requirements for state and local procurement systems.... Each construction
contract ... must include certain contract provisions, including a clause allowing the contractor an
equitable contract price adjustment for unforeseen site conditions."); Lewis J. Baker, Procurement
Disputes at the State and Local Level. A Hodgepodge of Remedies, 25 PUB. CONT. L. 265, 284-85
(1996) (describing various federal requirements on awards to state and local government public works
grantees); F. Trowbridge Vom Baur, A Personal History of the Model Procurement Code, 25 PUB.
CoNT. L. 149, 161 (1996) (discussing federal policy).
9. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. The question of whether standard form clauses
are fair is particularly timely because there is some movement toward a uniform construction code.
"At its national convention held in March 1995, the Board of Directors of the AGC [Associated
General Contractors of America] adopted the recommendation of the Contract Documents Committee
that the AGC express a willingness to assist the ABA Forum Committee in exploring the possibility
of creating a uniform construction code." Mark L. McAlpine & David A. Breuch, A Uniform
Construction Law Code: Is There a Foundation to Build on? 74 MICH. B.J. 554, 558 n.2 (1995).
The form contracts promulgated by the American Institute of Architects (AIA), in particular,
"essentially embody the working relationships within the construction industry." Gene Ming Lee,
A Casefor Fairness in Public Works Contracting, 65 FORDHAm L. REv. 1075, 1076-77 (1996).
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the impact of the differing site condition provision upon two common law
risk-allocation rules and explores the normative and economic rationales
for shifting most risks to the owner, especially as applied to large public
and private entities regularly engaged in construction contracting. For
those public and private entities that voluntarily elect to use the differing
site condition provision as a risk-allocation tool, this Article proposes
certain modest changes to the current clause, moving toward a risk-
sharing model. By risk-sharing rather than risk-allocating unforeseen
conditions, contractors will have less incentive to bid inaccurately, owners
will have more incentive to disclose information about sites, and all
parties will have less motivation to litigate claims.
Finally, the Article questions the rationales for inclusion of the
provision in construction contracts of small municipalities and private
owners, both of which enter the construction market less often or enjoy
fewer financial reserves with which to bear the risks the clause allocates
to them.'0 Therefore, this Article suggests that standard form construction
contract documents provide contractual choices so that contractors and
owners negotiate the issue of who should bear the cost of differing site
conditions.
II. THE COMMON LAW TREATMENT OF DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS
ON CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
Two common law rules favor the owner and disfavor the contractor
when unforeseen conditions create additional expenses during the
performance of a construction contract. First, in a fixed-price contract,
the common law allocates the risk of additional expenses due to
unforeseen conditions to the contractor. Second, even if the owner
desired to voluntarily modify the contract to account for the additional
expenses, the traditional pre-existing duty rule poses a formidable
obstacle because the new promise is unsupported by consideration.
10. See John F. McGuihn, Use and Abuse of Risk Allocation in the Construction Industry, in
I ALLOCATINO RISKS IN TODAY'S CONSTRUCTION: A SEARCH FOR FAiRNESs AND SOLUnoN 1, 5-6
(1989) (A.B.A. Forum on the Construction Industry, Fifth Annual Meeting) (calling for reform in
risk-allocation process); Lee, supra note 9, at 1118 (calling for reform in competitive public bid
contracts, saying "[t]he government should pay for all contingent conditions when and if they are
encountered," and arguing that "contractors are not capable of taking on this risk").
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A. Differing Site Conditions and the Common Law: No Relieffor the
Contractor
The common law affords tremendous risk protection to an owner
against demands for additional compensation by a contractor because of
unforeseen subsurface and latent conditions on the owner's property. The
general rule is that no matter how onerous the burden, once a contractor
has promised to perform, any added expense caused by unforeseen
conditions is allocated to the contractor. The early, well-known case of
Stees v. Leonard" is illustrative. Mr. Stees contracted with Mr. Leonard,
an architect-builder, to erect a three-story business on Mr. Stees' proper-
ty.12 When the structure was nearly completed, it collapsed because the
soil retained too much water and could not support the structure's
weight. 3 Indeed, the evidence suggested that the soil was like "quick-
sand," "soft, slippery, porous and unsafe."' 4 Mr. Leonard attempted to
rebuild the structure for Mr. Stees, but when the building was near com-
pletion it collapsed again.' Mr. Leonard abandoned the project and
refused to perform under the contract.' 6 Mr. Stees filed suit, seeking 1)
return of his progress payments, 2) damages for the loss of use of the
land, and 3) damages for injury to adjacent property that the falling
building caused. 7 Mr. Leonard defended the suit by blaming Mr. Stees
for failing to provide a suitable location upon which to build. 8 Although
each blamed the other, the facts suggested that neither Mr. Stees nor Mr.
Leonard knew or could have known that lurking below the placid surface
of the street was an underground monster capable of swallowing a three-
story building in a single gulp.'9
II. 20 Minn. 494 (1874).
12. See id. at 496.
13. See id.
14. Id. at 498.
15. See id. at 497.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 499.
19. Monsters still lurk beneath the ground. Consider the following:
As soon as the concrete was poured, it disappeared.
While puzzled construction workers looked on, wet cement -- which was supposed to
form underground support piers for new buildings at the city's Southside Sewage Treat-
ment Plant seeped by the ton into marshy earth.
"The concrete dropped two feet, three feet, five feet, 10 feet in the hole," said Jim
Milstead, Dallas Water Utilities' project manager ....
A project that was supposed to be an example of environmental responsibility became,
by the end of 1986, a mess.
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In Stees the court announced a rule, still followed today absent
contractual agreement to the contrary, that protects the property owner
from the risks of unforeseen conditions and holds the contractor to its
word regardless of the burden:
The general principle of law which underlies this case, is well established. If
a man bind himself, by a positive, express contract, to do an act in itself
possible, he must perform his engagement, unless prevented by the act of God,
the law, or the other party to the contract. No hardship, no unforeseen
hindrance, no difficulty short of absolute impossibility, will excuse him from
doing what he has expressly agreed to do. This doctrine may sometimes seem
to bear heavily upon contractors; but, in such cases, the hardship is attributable,
not to the law, but to the contractor himself, who has improvidently assumed
an absolute, when he might have taken only a qualified liability.2"
Mr. Stees won a money judgment based upon Mr. Leonard's breach of
promise to erect a building.2 The rule remains that if the construction
of the promised object is not impracticable22 then the contractor must
perform, even if continuation of the project might far exceed the
anticipated cost of completion.23
Bruce Tomaso, Sewage Plant Expansion Started Badly, Got Worse, DALLAS MORNiNaG NEws, Aug.
8, 1987, at 33A (detailing a changed condition claim).
20. Stees, 20 Minn. at 503. The building could apparently have been built if "stronger
foundations" had been used, the land drained, and then continuously drained during construction.
See id. at 508. One aspect of the dispute was which party had agreed to keep the soil drained after
the problem was discovered during construction. See id. The pre-existing duty rule precluded the
court from affixing blame to Mr. Stees for his alleged promise during performance of the contract
to keep the soil drained during construction. See id. at 510.
21. See id. at 500.
22. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONmRACrs § 266(1) (1981) states:
Where, at the time a contract is made, a party's performance under it is impracticable
without his fault because of a fact of which he has no reason to know and the non-
existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty to render
that performance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate the contrary.
However, claiming impracticability would have afforded Mr. Leonard no relief. The RESTATEMENT
draws an illustration from Stees v. Leonard
A contracts with B to build a house on B's land according to plans furnished by A.
Because of subsoil conditions, of which A has no reason to know, this cannot be done
unless the land is drained at great expense. After the house is partly completed, it
collapses because of these conditions, and A refuses to continue the work. The court may
determine from all the circumstances, including the fact that A furnished the plans, that
A is under a duty to build the house in spite of the impracticability of doing so, and that
A is liable to B for breach of contract.
Id. § 266 cmt. b, illus. 8. See generally John Elofson, The Dilemma of Changed Circumstances in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis of the Foreseeability and Superior Risk Bearer Tests, 30
COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1996) (endorsing a foreseeability approach in determining whether
a changed circumstance is impracticable or an allocated risk).
23. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
64 (1981) (citing Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 494 (1874) (holding that the builder's performance was
120 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
The common law rule recognizes that the parties bargained for a fixed
price and an unwavering promise to live up to their words. The message
of the common law rule is clear: promises must be kept. The common
law forces the contractor to perform or pay damages even in the face of
extreme hardship.
B. The Pre-Existing Duty Rule and Contract Modification: Failing to
Accommodate Changed Circumstances
In addition to the common law rule allocating the risk of unforeseen
conditions to the contractor, a second rule also favors the owner over the
contractor when a differing site condition is discovered. The common
law's pre-existing duty rule precludes even a voluntary modification of
a construction contract by an owner and contractor to account for
unforeseen conditions. The pre-existing duty rule's more modem form,
under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, now permits such modifica-
tions under certain circumstances. Thus, in its current form, the pre-
existing duty rule has lost its sharp edge, but it still affords protection to
an owner from coercive demands by a contractor to modify the contract
due to unforeseen conditions. 4 In the case of differing site conditions,
not excused and granting judgment in favor of the owner; however, the award was limited to the
return of progress payments)); see also GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT 77-78 (1974). As
one court explained,
It is conceded that, under the common-law rule, a contractor who undertakes an entire
contract for erecting a building is presumed, in absence of an expressed provision to the
contrary, to have assumed the risk of unforeseen contingencies arising during the course
of the work, unless performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, the law or the
other party.
David J. Hatem, Differing Site Conditions: Liability Precautions for Design Professionals, 61 DEF.
COUNS. J. 565, 566 (1994) (quoting Eastern Tunneling Corp. v. Southgate Sanitation Dist., 487 F.
Supp. 109, 113 (D. Colo. 1979)); see also Ruby-Collins, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 740 F. Supp. 1159,
1173 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (holding that the contractor may not recover additional costs, in absence of
differing site condition clause, when excavated soil was not suitable for backfill), aft'd, 930 F.2d 23.
(4th Cir. 1991); American Demolition, Inc. v. Hapeville Hotel Ltd. Partnership, 413 S.E.2d 749, 752
(Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the risk of extra expense associated with subsurface conditions is
on the contractor absent a changed condition clause).
24. The rule is often condemned. See Kevin M. Teeven, Development of Reform of the
Preexisting Duty Rule and its Persistent Survival, 47 ALA. L. REv. 387, 387 (1996) ("The tenacious
400-year survival of the much-criticized preexisting duty rule reflects the impregnability of the
common law of contract's core doctrinal fortress of consideration."); Mark B. Wessman, Retraining
the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of Consideration, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 713,
729-30 ("Of all the purported corollaries to the doctrine of consideration, the pre-existing duty rule
has probably received the harshest treatment at the hands of the critics. It appears to have no current
academic advocates .... [It] is, nevertheless, one of the most durable of the corollaries to the
doctrine of consideration ...."). This Article takes no position as to its viability. It merely
questions why, given its existence, owners voluntarily surrendered the benefits received through its
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the pre-existing duty rule protects the owner from a contractor's demands
for modification of the contract following discovery of an unforeseen
condition creating additional work during performance of the contract.25
The pre-existing duty rule is grounded in two important contract
principles. First, it is consistent doctrinally with the fundamental contract
principle that promises must be supported by consideration to be
enforceable.26  Second, the pre-existing duty rule protects and supports
the contract principle that promises must be given with free will and
without coercion.2 Both principles are equally at stake when applied to
construction contract modifications. The rule protects the consideration
principle because the rule protects the value of the original bargain.28 In
a fixed-fee contract, an owner originally bargained for a fixed price for
completion of a project and an owner stands to lose the benefit of that
bargain by a mid-performance modification of the price. Without new
consideration, the full benefit of the initial bargain would be diminished.29
Moreover, during the performance, the owner is typically at a bargaining
disadvantage because the owner cannot effectively counter the
contractor's threat to abandon the project unless the contractor receives
additional payment. The contractor that threatens to quit the contract has
already determined that abandonment and breach of the contract is an
economically more favorable risk than continued performance. Thus, an
owner has little to withhold in bargaining for a demanded modification.
application, in the event of differing site conditions.
25. See Wessman, supra note 24, at 749-50 (describing the application of the pre-existing duty
rule in construction cases)..
26. See Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain
Principle, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1123, 1184 (1986) (stating that the pre-existing duty rule is "consistent
with the underlying premise of complete risk allocation"). But see Teeven, supra note 24, at 468-69
(stating that the pre-existing duty rule is not well-grounded in the consideration doctrine).
27. See Teeven, supra note 24, at 469-70; see also Richard Nathan, Grappling with the Pre-
Existing Duty Rule: A Proposal for a Statutory Amendment, 23 AM. Bus. L. 509, 511 (1986)
(citing IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 183 (1963); 1 S. WILLIsTON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 130 (3d ed. 1957)).
28. But see Teeven, supra note 24, at 399-406 (arguing that modifications should be permissi-
ble without consideration and that the pre-existing duty rule is not doctrinally supported by consider-
ation analysis nor fairly justified where other judicial doctrines can protect against coercive demands).
29. But see Wessman, supra note 24, at 743-44 (suggesting that the pre-existing duty rule has
no consideration rationale).
Even if it is assumed that only promises that are components of bargained exchanges
should be enforced, an adjustment to only one side of a bargained exchange does not
transform the entire exchange transaction into a gift transaction.... Nothing in the very
notion of consideration, however, logically compels that modifications be treated like
initial contract formation or that parties who have agreed on the terms of a proposed ex-
change may not revisit and revalue it if they choose.
1997]
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The pre-existing duty rule protects the owner from coercive demands
while in this weakened position."
An early classic construction case demonstrates the operation of the
pre-existing duty rule and its benefit to the owner. In Lingenfelder v.
Wainwright Brewery Co.,"' an architect who was hired to draft plans and
oversee the erection of a brewery threatened to stop work without
additional payment for the previously promised services.3" The court
rejected the mid-performance modification, explaining:
"That a promise to pay a man for doing that which he is already under contract
to do is without consideration" is conceded by respondents. The rule has been
so long imbedded in the common law and decisions of the highest courts of the
various states that nothing but the most cogent reasons ought to shake it....
... Nothing we have said is intended as denying parties the right to modify
their contracts, or make new contracts, upon new or different considerations,
and binding themselves thereby. What we hold is that, when a party merely
does what he has already obligated himself to do, he cannot demand an
additional compensation therefor, and although by taking advantage of the
necessities of his adversary he obtains a promise for more, the law will regard
it as nudum pactum, and will not lend its process to aid in the wrong."
In Lingenfelder, the court desired to protect the original consideration and
prevent coercive modifications. Defendant Wainwright Brewery had
bargained to pay a fixed amount in consideration for the architect's
services and stood to lose the benefit of that bargain by giving a new
promise without new consideration from the architect. Moreover, the
mid-performance timing of the proposed contract modification placed the
brewery at a bargaining disadvantage.
30. See City of Miami Beach v. Fryd Constr. Corp., 264 So. 2d 13, 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972).
While the general rule [the pre-existing duty rule] has been criticized and exceptions
created, one justification for its continued existence is that a contractor may purposely
submit a low bid in order to secure the contract, but then refuse to perform, after it is too
late to obtain another contractor without loss or inconvenience, in order to induce a
promise to pay, more.
Id.
31. 15 S.W. 844 (Mo. 1891).
32. See id. at 844.
33. Id. at 848. The most notable case articulating the pre-existing duty rule's protection from
coercion, Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902), demonstrated that mid-way
through any contract, one party may be disadvantaged and vulnerable to abusive bargaining. See id.
at 102. In Alaska Packers', sailors and fishermen promised to work a short fishing season in Alaska.
See id. at 100. The fishermen refused to complete their promised work absent a contract
modification for more payment because the fishing nets were allegedly defective. See id. at 101.
Although Alaska Packers' Association acceded to the demands of the sailors and fishermen, the
appellate court declined to enforce the modification, clearly believing the fisheraen and sailors had
taken advantage of Alaska Packers' geographic isolation and inability to recruit new workers for such
a short season or to recoup the considerable loss from a work stoppage. See id. at 102.
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The pre-existing duty rule, when rigidly applied, also leads to seeming-
ly unfair results.34 Some modifications are reached without apparent
coercion, and the consideration for the modified bargain represents a
fairer transaction than the initial bargain. In that instance, the modifica-
tion actually prevents unjust enrichment of the promisor." Judicial
discomfort with the pre-existing duty rule grew as courts recognized that
some modifications should be enforced despite the absence of consider-
ation.36 A softening of the rule gained judicial approval and is reflected
in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts."
The modem pre-existing duty rule now charts a middle ground,
protecting both consideration and free will while softening the harsh
results of the pre-existing duty rule in certain cases. In order to protect
the value of the original consideration, a modification must now be "fair
and equitable" in view of unanticipated circumstances.3" Thus, the
modification can be viewed as representing, at least partially, new and
previously unbargained for performance. Moreover, as the Restatement's
commentary explains, "fair and equitable" also speaks to the "absence of
coercion," and the phrase cautions the trier of fact to assess "the relative
financial strength of the parties ...to show or negate imposition or
unfair surprise.
' 3 9
34. See generally Teeven, supra note 24 (discussing history of pre-existing duty rule).
35. Massachusetts case law permits a court to find consideration in a promise to perform what
one is already bound to perform because the new promise is given in lieu of an action for damages
to secure performance. See Swartz v. Lieberman, 80 N.E.2d 5, 6 (Mass. 1948) (citing Munroe v.
Perkins, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 298 (1830)). But see JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CONTRACTS § 4-8 (2d ed. 1977) (criticizing the Massachusetts rule).
36. See Nathan, supra note 27, at 511 ("The pre-existing duty rule became the subject of
growing judicial hostility because it irrationally prevented intentional agreements from being
enforced. Through a technical and often confused redefinition of consideration or the legal fiction
of rescission, courts attempted to escape from this perceived legal straitjacket.").
The Uniform Commercial Code freely permits mid-performance modifications without new
consideration. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (1981). However, it requires that all such modifications meet the
test of good faith and legitimate commercial reason. See id. § 2-209 cmt. 1; see also J. WMTE &
R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-6, at 44 n.26 (4th ed. 1995) (citing Robert A.
Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of
Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849 (1979)).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) (1981) permits modification of a"contract
not fully performed on either side .. . if the modification is fair and equitable in view of
circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made ......
38. See id.
39. Id. § 89 cmt. b. Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630 (R.I. 1974), demonstrates application of
the Restatement rule. Id. at 636. In Angel, a trash collector operated a trash business in Newport
according to a series of five-year fixed-price contracts. See id. at 632. Unexpectedly, in the 1960s,
the town enjoyed tremendous growth. See id. While in prior years, fewer than 25 homes were added
to the trash collector's route, suddenly the city grew by 400 homes in 1967. See id The town
willingly agreed to modify the contract, but a disgruntled taxpayer filed suit See id Why would
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Nowhere is it more likely that contracting parties will encounter
differing and unforeseen conditions than on construction projects. While
contractors and owners hope that in pricing a project they can anticipate
what they will encounter under the land or otherwise hidden from view,
clearly they cannot predict this with certainty. Under the common law,
the fixed-price construction contract assigns the risk of unknown
conditions to the contractor. The contractor, through experience or
careful bid preparation and site inspection, is expected to bid an amount
sufficient to cover even the unexpected. However, the modem common
law contract modification rules recognize that contract plans sometimes
go awry. The modem rule permits flexibility during the performance of
construction contracts by permitting modifications based upon unforeseen
conditions. At the same time, the modem rule protects the initial bargain
against the potential coercion and duress of mid-performance modifica-
tions by requiring fair and equitable terms and methods of bargaining.4 °
Without surrendering judicial authority to police the contracting
process, the common law now permits some of the flexibility that modem
contract relationships demand. In the context of construction contracts
governed by the common law, the owner continues to enjoy an advan-
tage. The owner may agree voluntarily to a modification for unforeseen
conditions; however, the owner is under no obligation to modify the
contract because the law continues to allocate the risk of unforeseen
conditions to the contractor.4' The common law permits the owner to
enjoy the benefit of a contractor's failure to anticipate the actual
conditions or to bid a sufficient contingency and holds the contractor to
its promise regardless of the hardship.
Newport agree to do what it had no obligation to do, namely, pay additional amounts? The long-
term relationship, the fact that the trash collector would build larger contingencies into later contracts,
the fear of breach (no politician wants trash on the street), and fundamental fairness are possible mo-
tives. Clearly the town valued the continuing relationship. The court upheld the modification,
relying on the Restatement, and found the modification voluntary, fair, and equitable. See id. at 635-
38.
40. See, e.g., Brian Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Brighenti, 405 A.2d 72, 75-76 (Conn. 1978)
(holding that an oral agreement to modify a construction contract is supported by additional
consideration when unanticipated and burdensome conditions were encountered and modification is
fair and equitable).
41. Cf. Watkins & Son, Inc. v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591, 594 (N.H. 1941) (permitting oral
agreement to supersede prior contract when unexpected rock was encountered during excavation of
cellar).
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III. DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS CLAUSES: ALTERING COMMON LAW
PRINCIPLES
A. Requiring Contract Modification and Reallocating Risks
A contract provision now almost uniformly appearing in fixed-fee
construction contracts dramatically changes the common law. The
differing site condition or changed condition provisions that the American
Institute of Architects (AIA),4 2 the Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR),43 and the Engineers' Joint Contract Documents Committee
42. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, General Conditions of the Contract for Con-
struction, AIA DOCUMENT A201 § 4.3.6 (I lth ed. 1987) [hereinafter AIA DOCUMENT A201]:
Claims for Concealed or Unknown Conditions. If conditions are encountered at the site
which are (i) subsurface or otherwise concealed physical conditions which differ
materially from those indicated in the Contract Documents or (2) unknown physical
conditions of an unusual nature, which differ materially from those ordinarily found to
exist and generally recognized as inherent in construction activities of the character
provided for in the Contract Documents, then notice by the observing party shall be given
to the other party promptly before conditions are disturbed and in no event later than 21
days after first observance of the conditions. The Architect will promptly investigate such
conditions and, if they differ materially and cause an increase or decrease in the
Contractor's cost of, or time required for, performance of any part of the Work, will
recommend an equitable adjustment in the Contract Sum or Contract Time, or both. If
the Architect determines that the conditions at the site are not materially different from
those indicated in the Contract Documents and that no change in the terms of the Contract
is justified, the Architect shall so notify the Owner and Contractor in writing, stating the
reasons. Claims by either party in opposition to such determination must be made within
21 days after the Architect has given notice of the decision. If the Owner and Contractor
cannot agree on an adjustment in the Contract Sum or Contract Time, the adjustment shall
be referred to the Architect for initial determination, subject to further proceedings
pursuant to Paragraph 4.4.
43. Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-2 (1996) (discussing differing site
conditions):
(a) The Contractor shall promptly, and before the conditions are disturbed, give a
written notice to the Contracting Officer of (1) subsurface or latent physical conditions
at the site which differ materially from those indicated in this contract, or (2) unknown
physical conditions at the site, of an unusual nature, which differ materially from those
ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of the character
provided for in the contract.
(b) The Contracting Officer shall investigate the site conditions promptly after
receiving the notice. If the conditions do materially so differ and cause an increase or
decrease in the Contractor's cost of, or the time required for, performing any part of the
work under this contract, whether or not changed as a result of the conditions, an
equitable adjustment shall be made under this clause and the contract modified in writing
accordingly.
(c) No request by the Contractor for an equitable adjustment to the contract under this
clause shall be allowed, unless the Contractor has given the written notice required;
provided, that the time prescribed in (a) above for giving written notice may be extended
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(EJCDC)44 adopted abrogate the two common law rules that protected the
owner from a demanded modification for unforeseen conditions during
performance of a construction contract. First, contrary to the common
law, the clause allocates risks of subsurface or latent conditions to the
owner under certain conditions.4 Moreover, these provisions obligate the
parties to modify their contract and to reach a new agreement when a
differing site condition is discovered during performance.46
Servidone Construction Corp. v. United States47 demonstrates how the
differing site condition alters the common law. The United States
contracted with Servidone, the second lowest bidder, to build an earthen
dam and lake.48 Servidone's bid of approximately $25 million was about
$3 million less than the government's initial estimate (excluding profit)
by the Contracting Officer.
(d) No request by the Contractor for an equitable adjustment to the contract for
differing site conditions shall be allowed if made after final payment under this contract.
44. The Engineers' Joint Contract Documents Committee's Differing Site Conditions provision
distinguishes between physical conditions and underground facilities. As to the former:
4.2.5. Possible Document Change: If ENGINEER concludes that there is a material error
in the Contract Documents or that because of newly discovered conditions a change in the
Contract Documents is required, a Work Directive Change or a Change Order will be
issued as provided in Article 10 to reflect and document the consequences of the inaccura-
cy or difference.
4.2.6. Possible Price and Time Adjustments: In each such case, an increase or decrease
in the Contract Price or an extension or shortening of the Contract Time, or any
combination thereof, will be allowable to the extent that they are attributable to any such
inaccuracy or difference. If OWNER and CONTRACTOR are unable to agree as to the
amount or length thereof, a claim may be made therefor as provided in Articles I I and
12.
ENGINEERS' JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTs COMMITTEE, STANDARD GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT §§ 4.2.54.2.6, at 11 (1983) [hereinafter EJCDC].
In the EJCDC, underground facilities are defined, in part, as "pipelines, conduits, ducts, cables,
wires, manholes, vaults, tanks, tunnels or other such facilities or attachments." Id. at 8. The General
Conditions also permit recovery by the contractor. When the contractor discovers an underground
facility "which was not shown or indicated in the Contract Documents and which [the contractor]
could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of .... [the contractor] shall be allowed an
increase in the Contract Price or an extension of the Contract Time" to the extent attributable to the
changed conditions. Id. § 4.3.2., at 11.
45. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-2 (discussing the allocation of risks to the government); AIA
DOCUMENT A201, supra note 42, § 4.3.6 (allocating risk of concealed or unknown conditions to
owners); EJCDC, supra note 44, § 8.6 (stating that the owner "is obligated to execute Change
Orders").
46. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-2(b) (stating that "an equitable adjustment shall be made"); A1A
DOCUMENT A201, supra note 42, § 4.3.6 (stating that "equitable adjustment in the Contract Sum or
Contract Time, or both" will be made); EJCDC, supra note 44, § 4.2.5 (stating that "a Work
Directive Change or a Change Order will be issued").
47. 19 Cl. Ct. 346 (1990), affd, 931 F.2d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
48. See id. at 349.
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of $28 million for the project.49 Servidone "encountered numerous
problems during construction of the dam that more than doubled its
anticipated cost"5 chiefly because "the soil was so difficult to excavate,
unload, and process that many additional and more powerful pieces of
equipment were required."'" Servidone claimed that the adverse soil
conditions were a differing site condition, of either a Type I or Type II
nature,52 and that it was entitled to an equitable adjustment of the
contract."
The court first reviewed whether the discovered soil condition
constituted a Type I differing site condition. In order to prove a Type I
condition, a contractor must show that "it encountered subsurface or
latent physical conditions at the site that differed materially from those
49. See id
50. Id. at 355.
51. Id.
52. The federal clause shifts two kinds of risk to the owner. When documents affirmatively
describe subsurface conditions that are different than those actually encountered, a Type I claim
arises, requiring:
(i) the contract documents must have affirmatively indicated or represented the subsurface
conditions which form the basis of the plaintiff's claims; (ii) the contractor must have
acted as a reasonably prudent contractor in interpreting the contract documents; (iii) the
contractor must have reasonably relied on the indications of subsurface conditions in the
contract; (iv) the subsurface conditions actually encountered, within the contract site area,
must have differed materially from the subsurface conditions indicated in the same
contract area; (v) the actual subsurface conditions encountered must have been reasonably
unforeseeable; and (vi) the contractor's claimed excess costs must be shown to be solely
attributable to the materially different subsurface conditions within the contract site.
Youngdale & Sons Constr. Co. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 528 (1993); see P.J. Maffei Bldg.
Wrecking Corp. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (1983) (Documents refers not just to bidding
documents but also to other documents referred to, or furnished to, bidders; "all that is required is
that there be enough of an indication on the face of the contract documents for a bidder reasonably
not to expect subsurface or latent physical conditions."), affid on other grounds, 732 F.2d 913 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); see also JUSTIN SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA
DOCUMENTS § 14.6, at 48 (Supp. 1988) ("Cases have given broad interpretation to this clause, the
indications giving rise to owner liability may merely have been a description of the project, or infor-
mation from which a reasonable contractor might 'infer' that the conditions would not be the
conditions encountered.").
A Type 11 claim is one in which the risk of the subsurface conditions was unknown to both parties
and not described within the contract documents: "Generally, the conditions must be unknown, un-
usual, and differ materially from what is ordinarily encountered. The difference then, is between
what is ordinarily expected to be found and that which actually is found." Gregory H. McClure,
Differing Site Conditions: Evaluating the Material Difference, 15 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 138, 162 (1984);
see also Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. at 528 (describing differences between Type I and Type II claims);
George Edson Mason, A Quantitative Risk Management Approach to the Selection of Construction
Contract Provisions 56 (1973) (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University), microformed on Technical
Report No. 173 (Univ. Microfilms Int'l) (stating that an owner may retain risk of differing site condi-
tions by the use of a changed condition or differing site conditions clause).
53. See Servidone, 19 Cl. Ct. at 355-56.
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expressly or impliedly indicated in the contract. 5 4  Servidone claimed
that the soil was wetter than indicated in the contract documents, and that
the government's use of a "liquid limit correlation curve" (LLCC) led
Servidone to mistakenly assume that "optimum moisture was also at its
optimum point of workability, and that no further moisture change would
be required.""5 As to the moisture content claim, the court found the
variation from the plans and the conditions encountered were not legally
significant.56  As to the LLCC, the court concluded that the curve
provided accurate information, but that "Servidone's real problem [was]
that its personnel did not understand the LLCC."57 The court denied
Servidone's Type I claims and concluded it "was less than reasonable for
[Servidone's] personnel to make assumptions about how the curve
worked in preparing the bid." 58
Servidone also alleged that the conditions encountered constituted a
Type II differing site condition.59 To prove a Type II condition, the
contractor must show that "it encountered an 'unknown physical [condi-
tion] at the site, of an unusual nature, differing materially from those
ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as inhering in the work
of the character provided for in this contract.""'6 Servidone complained
that the fill material was "extremely tough" and that "this toughness
54. Id. at 356; see also Youngdale & Sons Constr. Co. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 530
(1993) (stating that to prove a Type I condition, "plaintiff must prove that the government
affirmatively indicated or represented the subsurface conditions on which the basis of plaintiff's claim
is formed").
A Type I claim, unlike common law negligence or misrepresentation, requires no culpability. As
one court explained,
In misrepresentation, the wrong consists of misleading the contractor by a knowingly or
negligently untrue representation .... Some degree of Government culpability-either
untruth or such error as is the legal equivalent-must, however, be shown, and the
plaintiffs burden of proof is not satisfied merely by proof of a variation between the
subsurface conditions as stated in the contract and as encountered.
... In the modem version of the [differing site condition] clause,".., a finding that
the contractor was actively 'misled,' in the sense that the Government 'withheld' or
'concealed' information within its grasp, is not essential to proof of a changed condition.
... Fault on the part of the Government is not a necessary element."
Foster Constr. C.A. & Williams Bros. Co. v. United States, 435.F.2d 873, 880-81 (Ct. Cl. 1970)
(quoting United Contractors v. United States, 368 F.2d 585, 597 n.6 (CL Cl. 1966)).
55. Servidone, 19 Cl. Ct. at 357.
56. See id. at 356-57 (stating that the "maximum variation of approximately 3 percentage
points in moisture contents cited by Servidone is less than one fifth of the 17-point range of moisture
contents suggested by the boring logs" and the average was "near the range of moisture required by
the most demanding requirements in the contract").
57. Id. at 359.
58. Id.; see also Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. at 533 (discussing a "reasonably prudent contractor"
preparing a bid).
59. See Servidone, 19 Cl. Ct. at 360.
60. Id. at 360 (alteration in original).
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added dramatically to the cost of completion."' The United States, on
the other hand, defended against the claim by asserting the conditions
were typical of the Dallas/Fort Worth area where the work was taking
place.6" Evidence showed that the soil "behav[ed] like paraffin or grease"
and was "slick and sticky." '63 Servidone's experts testified that the clay
was unlike any encountered elsewhere in Dallas/Fort Worth." Even the
government's experts, who testified they had encountered such clay
before in the area, admitted that the soil's toughness yielded smaller
payloads than they experienced in nearby projects.6 The clay also caused
machinery to get stuck and was more difficult to unload than ordinarily
expected." Moreover, the contractor was forced to use additional and
more powerful machinery to plow and haul the clay.67 The clay also
caused "more frequent mechanical breakdowns."'k The court rejected the
government's position that the soil was not materially different than
ordinarily found, and concluded that the evidence showed "the materials
at [the project site] were unusual and differed materially not only from
other soils generally, but also with respect to soils generally encountered
in the Dallas/Ft. Worth area."69
Servidone also had to establish that the condition was unknown to it
and should not have reasonably been anticipated at the time of bidding
in order to prevail on the Type 1I claim.70 The question required the
court to examine Servidone's knowledge and conduct during the pre-bid
phase. The court's holding is surprising in light of its finding that
Servidone acted unreasonably in preparing its bid by conducting an
inadequate site inspection, by failing to inform itself about "local
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 360-61.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 362.
66. See id. at 363.
67. See id. at 365.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 370
70. See id. at 371. In Youngdale, the court explained:
The well-established principle is true that a contractor is not required "to discover hidden
subsurface conditions or those beyond the limits of an inspection appropriate to the time
available." Moreover, the court is also mindful of the fact that a contractor is not charged
with the technical intellect or grasp of a geologist or other expert. On the other hand, the
court also notes that a contractor is deemed to be on notice of any subsurface conditions
indicated, as here, within the boring logs of the contract documents, and, to the extent that
a contractor must interpret said logs, a contractor is to be held to the standard of a
reasonably prudent contractor in deciphering the meaning of such logs.
Youngdale & Sons Constr. Co. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 533-34 (1993) (citations omitted).
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anomalies," and by failing to learn about "the significance of the
"571LLCC .'
The court finds that Servidone did not act reasonably in preparing its bid.
The relevant inquiry, however, is how greater caution should have been
reflected in Servidone's bid .... The standard of reasonable anticipation does
not require a contractor to expect the worst .... Indeed this would be contrary
to the purpose of the differing site condition clause....
In sum, even a reasonable contractor, having done an adequate site
inspection, and having general knowledge about the difficulty of high LL soils,
would not have been warned about the actual condition of these soils. The
court thus holds that Servidone is entitled to recover to the extent the condition
it encountered could not have been reasonably anticipated. . . . While the
plaintiff acted unreasonably in preparing its bid, it would constitute a windfall
to defendant to hold that fact precluded a finding of a differing site condition
in these circumstances.
72
Servidone demonstrates the dramatic change in outcome when a
differing site condition provision is added to the contract. With the
provision, the contractor continues to bear the common law risk of the
usual and expected conditions at a construction site; however, the
contractor no longer must gamble that the unexpected might occur.
Unlike Mr. Leonard, who bore the risk and expense of extra work
engendered by latent soil conditions on Mr. Stees' property," Servidone
successfully forced the government owner to adjust the contract and bear
the risk of the unusual, latent soil conditions. Importantly, the court in
Servidone acknowledged that to hold otherwise, even in light of
Servidone's imprudence, would result in an unfair "windfall" to the
government owner." The windfall the court would not countenance was
only a windfall because the differing site condition provision substitutes
a promise of a fair price for the common law promise of a fixed price as
part of the original bargain. The differing site condition provision no
longer permits the owner to reap an unexpected windfall by paying less
than a fair price for work actually done. On the other hand, the provision
permits a contractor to win what is called a fixed-price contract without
the promise to complete the work for a fixed sum.
71. See Servidone, 19 Cl. Ct. at 373.
72. Id. at 374-75 (citations omitted). The court found Servidone made minimal inquiry into site
conditions despite its lack of experience in Texas and was imprudent in failing to inform itself about
the effect of the LLCC. See id. at 373.
,73. See supra text accompanying notes 11-21.
74. See Servidone, 19 Cl. Ct. at 383-90.
75. See id. at 375.
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B. Justifications for Including Differing Site Condition Provisions
As weary taxpayers Wonder why government projects have run over
budget,76 one questions why public property owners willingly adopted
contracting rules that reallocated the risk of unforeseen subsurface and
latent conditions to owners." The practice is more questionable consider-
ing that the modern common law permitted the owner the flexibility to
freely modify contracts as desired and to freely reject modifications and
hold contractors to their original promises. Certainly, the inclusion of the
clause and the resulting increase in actual performance costs as opposed
to the contract's bid price undermines public confidence in whether
government contracting procedures are fair to taxpayers. Public support
76. See supra notes 1-5; see also P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 531
A.2d 1330, 1341 (N.J. 1987) ("As we know, in the long run, it is the public that pays for these cost
over-runs .... Courts must weigh the unknown economic consequences .... ).
The public often questions why fixed price construction contract costs soar beyond the bottom
line. See, e.g., Ingrid Martin, Contractors Continue Work on Native Medical Center, 20 ALASKA J.
COM. 9, 9 (January 15, 1996) (discussing unanticipated ground water increasing project costs); Leslie
Haggin, $27MPublic Project Delayed: Is Garage Site a Danger? Contractors Cite Chemical Drums,
REcORD (Northern New Jersey), Sept. 15, 1995, at Al (recounting cost impact of discovery of
hazardous materials); Jon D. Markman, No Light at End of the Tunnel, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1995,
at B I (recounting tunneling contractor's difficulties with differing site conditions); Gordon Oliver,
Tri-Met Stuck in Tunnel Muck, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 5, 1995, at A-I ("[Flailure to predict
the underground conditions [loose rock] is a key factor in generating the extra costs that now plague
the project. The contract, like most major construction contracts, makes the owner... responsible
for unexpected, or changed conditions."); Andrew Taylor, Road Costs 'Overrun by 27% ', FIN. TIMES,
May 27, 1994, at 10 (discussing a study that found an average of 27% overruns on public roadwork
and that "claims for extra payments from contractors, mainly to cover unforeseen ground conditions,
were the biggest cause of overruns").
77. Not all risk is shifted by the provision. The conditions must differ "materially." See
McClure, supra note 52, at 142. In a Type I claim, materiality is measured by the materiality of the
difference between the contract documents and the actual conditions. See id at 145. In a Type I1
claim, materiality is measured by the conditions known as usual and ordinary in that geographical
area when performing the kind of work to be done. See id at 161-62.
Recovery has been allowed for unexpected natural conditions, subsurface conditions, man-made
conditions, and even equipment failure. See Shank-Artukovich v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 346
(1987), (recovery for "running ground" condition in tunnel excavation), af'd, 848 F.2d 1245 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 535, 544 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (recovery for
permafrost); W.S. Meadows Eng'g, Inc., 88-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,616 (1988) (recovery for un-
foreseen cost of air quality testing); Edgar M. Williams, General Contractor, 72-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
9734 (1972) (recovery for encountering double roof instead of industry standard of single roof).
On the other hand, contractors bear the risk of weather, changes in the economy, foreseeable
overruns, and unavailability of materials or supplies. See Associated Eng'rs & Contractors v. Hawaii,
567 P.2d 397, 403 (Haw. 1977) (bad weather atop Mauna Kea); see also Rolin v. United States, 160
F. Supp. 264, 268 (Ct. Cl. 1958) ("[IThe fact that a person who has contracted with the Government
to furnish materials or services encounters unforeseen difficulties, and thereby incurs unexpected
expenses, in the performance of the contract does not impose upon the Government any legal
obligation to relieve its contractor of the unexpected financial burden.").
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for public works and capital improvements wanes as the price escalates
over the expected costs.
The decision to reallocate risks in federal and standard form contracts
from the common law outcome represents a decades-long dialogue among
large private" and public owners, engineers, contractors, architects, and
designers concerning values and morality, survival and protection of
industries, and analysis of which party can better bear the risk of
unforeseen conditions while ensuring that projects continue to their
completion. 9 Both economic and normative justifications exist for
altering the common law when contractors and large owners engage in
continuing business relations via a bid process.
1. Economic Justifications
a. The Reallocation of Risk to the Owner: Designed to Ensure Fair
Bids
The primary purpose of differing site condition clauses within
construction contracts is to encourage contract bidders to submit their
lowest bids rather than build cushions into their bids for contingencies
that may never occur.8" As one court explained,
78. Justin Sweet complains that the participation of private owners in drafting the AIA clauses
is far less than perceived:
Another reason for AIA domination is the commonly held belief that the documents
reflect consensus as to the needs of construction industry participants and that the docu-
ments follow the customary practices of that industry. As I have noted, however, the
claim of industry consensus is increasingly being questioned, the principal challenge being
based upon the lack of owner participation.
Justin Sweet, The American Institute of Architects: Dominant Actor in the Construction Documents
Market, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 317, 324 [hereinafter Sweet Dominant Actor].
79. See Foster Constr. C.A. & Williams Bros. Co. v. United States, 435 F.2d 873, 887 (Ct. Cl.
1970) (discussing "long-standing, deliberately adopted procurement policy, expressed in the standard
mandatory changed conditions clause"); Sweet, Dominant Actor, supra note 78, at 322 (describing
collaborative process in developing AIA construction contract forms); see also Dale R. Ellickson,
Contracting Principles for Construction Contracts, in CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT DOCUMENTS, at 1,
2 (1990) (A.B.A. Section of Public Contract Law Conference Papers) (discussing the inclusive AIA
process and stating that "in order for standard forms to meet the goal of achieving a 'wise agree-
ment,' all parties must believe that their interests have been fairly considered"). See generally
CONSTRUCTION RISKS AND LIABILITY SHARING (1979) (conference co-sponsored by National
Academy of Engineering, American Bar Association, Department of the Army, U.S. Department of
Energy, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Department
of Transportation) [hereinafter CONSTRUCTION RISKS].
80. See Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. at 527 (1993) ("Therefore, to avoid any 'padding' of the
contract price by the contractors and to, at the very least, remove some of the gamble of bidding, the
government has provided the Differing Site Conditions clause.., as an ameliorating factor."); see
also Foster, 435 F.2d at 887 ("The Government benefits from more accurate bidding, without
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"Padding" of the contract may occur when the contractor attempts to allocate
some of the risk for delays or increases in costs of performance due to any
latent or subsurface conditions discovered during performance of the contract
which were generally not accounted for in the original bid estimate. As a
result, such contingency bidding by the contractor works against the govern-
ment, in that it is unable to obtain the best possible price for the construction
project."
Government analysts and researchers assert that in the "aggregate" the
risk allocation saves the owner money:
In theory, this equitable apportionment should minimize costs to the owner
because it allows the contractor to remove this contingency from the bid. The
owner avoids overpayment on the majority of projects and is required to pay for
differing site conditions only when they occur. Utility theory predicts that costs
rise when risk is inappropriately allocated, and preliminary studies by the United
States Corp of Engineers indicate, in the aggregate, that differing site conditions
clauses do reduce the cost of construction. 2
In the aggregate, including the differing site condition provision in the
contract means contractors will bid accurately,83 without fear of the
burden of changed conditions, and owners will pay for the work actually
done and not more. 4 Thus, for public and private entities soliciting bids
inflation for risks which may not eventuate."); Municipality of Anchorage v. Frank Coluccio Constr.
Co., 826 P.2d 316, 318 (Alaska 1992) ("Such clauses, which have long been staples of federal
contracts, are intended 'to prevent bidders from increasing their bid prices to protect against
misfortunes resulting from unforeseen developments, and thus avoid turning a construction contract
into a "gambling transaction.""' (quoting J.F. Shea Co. v. United States, 4 CI. Ct. 46, 50 (1983));
William S. Alldredge, Allocation of Risks, in I CONSTRUCTION RISKS, supra note 79, at 43 ("[O]wner
must assume the risk in order to achieve realistic bid prices."); Howard W. Ashcraft, Jr., Avoiding
and Managing Risk of Differing Site Conditions, in DIFFERING SITE CONDrIONS CLAIMS at 1, 4
(Robert F. Cushman & David R. Tortorello eds., 1992 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter CLAIMS]; Steven
C. Sanders, Unanticipated Environmental Costs in Construction Contracts: The Differing Site
Conditions Clause as a Risk Allocation Tool, 10 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T L. 53, 57 n.26 (1995)
("This clause promotes the advantages of the competitive bidding system by allowing bidders to
submit their lowest possible bid." (quoting RICHARD J. BEDNAR Er AL., CoNsTRUCnoN CON-
TRACTING 571 (1991))).
81. Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 527 n.19 (1993).
82. Ashcraft, supra note 80, § 1.4, at 4 (footnote omitted); see also Solomon Ribakoff,
Construction Contract Arrangements, in I CONsTRuCnON RISKS, supra note 79, at 83, 87.
83. See Hallmark Electrical Contractors, Inc., 87-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 19,870 (1987) ("While [the
contractor] is not required to anticipate the worst, it cannot anticipate hitting only the best from
within the usual range of hardness we see here.").
84. See STEvEN G.M. STEIN, I CONSTRUCTION LAW 5.07[viii], at 5-254.8 (1995) ("After
balancing the costs of the inclusion of contractor contingencies against the risk of being obligated
to pay legitimate claims for unforeseen conditions, both the AIA and the government have opted to
include 'differing site conditions' clauses in their standard forms." (footnotes omitted)); see also
David G. Hammond, Minimizing Risks and Mitigating Losses, in I CONSTRUCTION RISKS, supra note
79, at 133, 134 ("In fact, the owner may have increased costs for thus passing off the risks as the
contractors are smart enough to have recognized that considerable risks do exist and they make
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regularly, the differing site condition provision should be cost-reducing.
b. The Differing Site Condition Provision Reduces Litigation by
Imposing a Duty to Modify the Contract
The differing site condition provision, in theory, should reduce the
tendency of contracting parties to litigate or arbitrate claims. Unlike the
common law, which permits but does not require modification for
changed circumstances, the provision imposes upon the parties a duty to
negotiate a modification to the contract! Where a construction contract
contains a differing site condition provision, the owner must negotiate a
new price for the unanticipated work. 6
Despite the assumption that the clause promotes flexible, negotiated
solutions to unanticipated difficulties during contract performance, no one
doubts that the clause generates a tremendous amount of litigation."" The
suitable, not to say sometimes generous, allowances for contingency in their bids. In this way the
owner usually winds up paying for possible untoward events even if they do not actually occur on
the job.").
85. See Sanders, supra note 80, at 57 n.26 (1995) ("It provides a contractual remedy (when
the conditions are met) through negotiation rather than litigation." (quoting RICHARD J. BEDNAR ET
AL., CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING 571 (1991))).
The requirement to adjust the contract (departing from the common law) is essential, for as Scott
notes, "once contract risks are initially distributed, each party has less incentive to accommodate the
other's subsequent request for adjustment." Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term
Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 2008 (1987).
86. Both the federal regulations and the AIA documents permit the owner to "terminate for
convenience." Ashcraft supra note 80, at 20.
Termination for convenience is the ultimate contract safety valve and has several uses
relevant to differing site conditions claims. First, when it becomes apparent that the
differing site condition makes it impossible to deliver the project within the owner's
economic abilities or projections, the owner can abandon the project without further
liability.
Ashcrafi, supra note 80, at 20.
However, under the termination for convenience provisions, the owner must compensate the
contractor, including reasonable profit, for the work already performed even if no economic benefit
has been derived from the progress made. See id. An owner, depending upon the circumstances,
may find going forward less onetous than stopping performance altogether. See Michael W. Clancy,
1995 Year in Review: The Federal Circuit's Government Contract Decisions, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J.
537, 577 (1996) (stating the termination for convenience clause alters the contractor's favorable rights
at common law for breach and gives the government broad rights to terminate the contract without
allowing recovery for anticipated profits).
87. See STEIN, supra note 84, 5.07[viii] ("The possibility of encountering conditions which
are different from those expected is one ofthe few constants in the construction industry."); McClure,
supra note 52, at 139 ("The Differing Site Conditions clause has been the subject of much litigation
between construction contractors and the government."); see also JOHN R. CLARK, USING AND
UNDERSTANDING "ENGINEERING SERVICE AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 72 (1986) ("It is fair to
say that differing site conditions have been the subject of more claims between the parties than any
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differing site condition provision, in its current form, is probably less
effective at reducing litigation than it could be because the all-or-nothing
stakes are so high. While under a differing site condition provision the
owner must concede a duty to modify the contract for differing site
conditions, the 6wner can, nevertheless, dispute the existence of a valid
differing site condition claim or the amount of the adjustment owed.
Thus, the general duty to adjust the contract price does not necessarily
reduce disputes regarding whether to adjust the contract in a particular
case and, if so, to determine by how much the contract should be
adjusted.
The common law also fosters its share of litigation because of its abun-
dant escape valves for the contractor trapped in a losing contract as a
result of unforeseen conditions at the work site."8 Moreover, without the
dispute resolution and management provisions found in the standard form
contract documents and the federal provisions, the common law promotes
an adversarial rather than negotiated resolution of disputes. Thus
although imperfect, relative to the common law, the standard form and
government contracts better facilitate nonadversarial resolutions of
disputes.
c. The Differing Site Provision Protects the Bidder Pool
The differing site condition provision spares contractors from inordi-
nate losses associated with changed circumstances and thus protects their
financial well-being. A large owner, especially the federal government,
may have an interest in protecting and maintaining a financially healthy
pool of qualified bidders for its projects and find this desirable even
other matter that has arisen during construction."); CLAIMS, supra note 80, at i ("Given the physical
uncertainties inherent in any construction project and the widespread use of differing site condition
clauses, it is not surprising that a large number of these claims occur.").
On the other hand, attempts to transfer the risk to the contractor, such as by the use of
exculpatory clauses concurrently with differing site condition provisions, also generates a fair share
of litigation. See Max W. Strauss, Risk and Liability Sharing: The Owner's View, in I CONSTRUC-
TION RISKS, supra note 79, at 28 ("As a matter of fact, it frequently doubles their exposure to some
risks; once in the form of bid contingencies and again in having the clause held invalid either in
arbitration or litigation.").
88. The contractor could seek relief based upon noncontractual claims of negligence, fraud,
misrepresentation, breach of warranty, or other equitable doctrines such as mutual mistake. The
contractor would assert, for example, that misrepresentations about the job site induced the
contractor's low bid. See Alan S. Pralgever, Common Law Theories for Recovery, in CLAIMS, supra
note 80, at 95; see also Kenneth M. Cushman et al., Contractor's Rights and Duties: Bid Disputes
and Associated Problems, Differing Site Conditions and Site Inspection Clauses, Change Orders, and
Contract Technical Defenses, in DRAFTING CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND HANDLING CONSTRUC-
TION LITIGATION: PREPARING FOR THE "NEW" PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WORKS, at 61, 91-99 (PLI Real
Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 391, 1993) (citing cases).
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though it increases its own costs.8 9 After all, these large owners conduct
business through bidding and each needs a pool of bidders in order to
ensure competition." Additionally, the large owner may require
extremely specialized work that only a small group of contractors can
perform.9 One very costly job may drive a contractor out of business,
eventually hurting the large owner who requires specialized services in
multiple contracts. Absorbing the cost of unforeseen conditions protects
the industries upon which the large owner depends. Moreover, contrac-
tors may elect not to bid on high-risk projects, finding the risks unaccept-
ably high. In the long run, a reluctance to compete among qualified
bidders injures the large owner doing business via a bid process.9
d. The Differing Site Provision Keeps Down the Costs of Preparing
Bids and Doing Business
A differing site condition clause relieves a bidding contractor from the
Hobson's choice of either conducting extensive site exploration (for a job
it may not win) or accounting for contingencies in its bid (and thus over-
pricing its bid).93 Furthermore, pre-bid exploration costs by the success-
ful bidder are eventually passed on to the owner during the life of the
awarded contract. Extensive pre-bid exploration by each bidder also
raises the cost of doing business generally.94 Therefore, it is in the
interest of owners doing business by bids to provide as much information
about sites as possible and to discourage bidders from conducting
89. See Foster Constr. C.A. & Williams Bros. Co. v. United States, 435 F.2d 873, 887 (Ct. Cl.
1970) (stating that contractors "will have no windfalls and no disasters").
90. See CARL A. ERIKSON ET AL., CONSTRUCTION ENG'G RESEARCH LABORATORY, PRELIMI-
NARY INVESTIGATIONS OF RISK SHARING IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS, REP. No. CERL-IR-P-88,
at 17 (1978); T.G. McCusker, Risk Allocation, in 2 CONSTRUCTION RISKS, supra note 79, at 57 ("In
fact, the public benefit is better secured if the contractor stays in business.").
91. See Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 530 (CL Cl. 1965) (noting
that when awarding bid to new contractor, government contemplated as a benefit that it would
"broaden the manufacturing base"), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966).
92. See Sanders, supra note 80, at 56 n.21 (1995) (citing John F. Seymour, Liability of
Government Contractors for Environmental Damage, 21 PUB. CONT. L.J. 491, 522 (1992)).
93. See Foster, 435 F.2d at 887 ("Reliance [on data supplied by government] is affirmatively
desired by the Government, for if bidders feel they cannot rely, they will revert to the practice of
increasing their bids.").
94.
If the contractor could not rely on his own reasonable expectations or contract represen-
tations, and had to perform expensive testing and investigating, the costs would be passed
on to the government .... "If every bidder were required to perform all the investiga-
tions, even though the chance of receiving the bid was remote, the number of bids would
decrease and the dollar amount of the bids would increase."
McClure, supra note 52, at 143 (quoting Robert E. McKee, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 414 F. Supp. 957,
959 (N.D. Ga. 1976)).
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extensive, independent investigations that add to the cost of doing
business."
The allocation of risks for unknown site conditions to the owner may
be appropriate for the large owner with extensive knowledge or ability to
obtain data about its site. However, the differing site condition provision
requires contractors and owners to make subtle, sophisticated distinctions
between unknown or unusual conditions and those that should have been
reasonably anticipated.96  Contractors remain obligated to conduct
reasonable site inspections and to discover that which reasonable,
intelligent contractors would discover.97  Under the differing site
condition provision, the scope of the site inspection becomes one source
of dispute, whereas under the common law all site inspection responsibili-
ties are assigned to the contractor. Thus, the clause imperfectly relieves
the contractor of pre-bid site inspection and instead creates a breeding
ground for litigation.98
e. The Differing Site Condition Provision Moves Performance
Forward
Under standard form and federal contracts, performance of the contract
is expected to continue even when disputes arise or conditions change."
Equitable adjustments may be arbitrated or litigated if they cannot be
resolved as demands for adjustments are made but performance moves
forward nevertheless."° In fact, the standard contract documents and the
95. See Richard ]. Kendall, Changed Conditions as Misrepresentation in Government Construc-
tion Contracts, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 978, 979-80, 982 (1967) (explaining that since 1926 the
federal government has accepted the risk of unforeseen physical conditions: "The cost of exploration
would probably ultimately rest with the Government which would, in effect, be paying many times
for the same information.").
96. See supra notes 47-72 and accompanying text.
97. See Servidone Constr. Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 346, 373 (1990), affd, 931 F.2d
860 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Youngdale & Sons Constr. Co. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 533
(1993).
98. In Servidone, for example, the court faulted Servidone for not discussing the job with more
experienced contractors, for not attempting to verify the boring logs, and for not cutting a test trench.
See Servidone, 19 Cl. Ct at 373. Thus, the clause does not relieve the contractor of site inspection
responsibilities. Instead it creates an ill-defined "reasonable contractor" standard by which to resolve
their dispute. The common law, with its absolute allocation, at least left the contractor and owner
no room for dispute as to what the contractor must do pre-bid. See also Sweet, Dominant Actor,
supra note 78, at 329 (illustrating that AIA documents are imperfect at proper risk distribution and
risk avoidance).
99. See Lee, supra note 9, at 1084-86 (stating that construction contracts are designed to
anticipate changes and provide methods to resolve disputes).
100. See Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854, 866 (1978)
[hereinafter MacNeil, Adjustment of Long-Term Relations] (explaining that AIA's designation of an
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federal regulations are designed to preserve contractual relations by
providing a process to resolve disputes during the project or to reserve
disputes until after completion.''
Although the modem common law rule permits modifications during
performance at the owner's option, unlike the standard form documents
and the federal regulations, there is no mechanism to encourage negotia-
tions while simultaneously requiring continued performance. Under the
common law, the contractor's threat to abandon a project if the contract
is not modified is part and parcel of the coercion that the pre-existing
duty rule sought to prevent. The federal and standard form differing site
condition provision, coupled with the claims procedures, is therefore
superior to the common law in preventing unresolved disputes from
destroying the contractual relationship. 2 However, because entitlement
to an adjustment depends upon proving the existence of a condition that
warrants the adjustment and proving the amount of the adjustment, there
remains sufficient uncertainty to encourage litigation of disputes.'0 3
f. The Differing Site Condition Provision Reduces the Contractor's
Incentive to Recover Costs Inappropriately
Under the common law, contractors that find themselves in financially
losing contracts due to unanticipated conditions may attempt recovery
through indirect and improper methods.0 4 For example, they may neglect
the job and spend their time on more profitable work or they may cut
comers and compromise quality in ways that are imperceptible to the
architect to resolve disputes between an owner and a contractor provides flexibility in the relationship
between the parties); see also Sweet, Dominant Actor, supra note 78, at 326-29 (explaining that AIA
documents provide for continuation of the project during disputes). See generally Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in the United States Construction
Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 65 (1996) (describing the arbitration process and stating that the
United States construction industry is an innovator in the field of alternative dispute resolution).
101. See Lee, supra note 9, at 1084-86 (explaining that construction contracts are not static
documents, but are designed to anticipate changes and provide "protocols to resolve disagreements").
102. See Thomas R. Kuesel, Allocation of Risks, in CONSTRUCTION RISKS, supra note 79, at 63
("Unreasonably burdening the contractor does not necessarily rid the owner of the risk. Default on
the part of the contractor in whole or in part is always a very real prospect.").
103. See Scott, supra note 85, at 2021 (noting that even with adjustment clauses, the threat of
substantial losses precludes "effective bargaining over the appropriate responses to an adjustment
contingency").
104. See JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL AsPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CON-
STRUCTION PROCESS § 25.04, at 542 (5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS] ("Tlhe
ruthlessly competitive construction market may mean that contractors do not include contingencies
for subsurface conditions into their bid prices. While this may appear to be beneficial to the owner,
the contractor who loses money is likely to make a claim and may win it; in any event, all the parties
will suffer extensive claims overhead.").
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owner. °5 The differing site condition provision promotes direct recovery
rather than indirect and inefficient recoupment of costs. Providing this
mechanism for direct recovery of unanticipated costs reduces indirect
recovery through inferior performance, a result benefiting both parties.
2. Normative Justifications
a. The Fair Price Principle
The differing site condition provision, in addition to promoting lower
bids, also ensures fairer compensation for work. The clause achieves two
goals of the government, that it pay a fair price and that it protect its
business partners. The clause achieves these goals by sacrificing the
predictability of the so-called fixed-price contract." 6 However, ensuring
that the "'contractor is paid for what [it] does and conversely that the
Government gets something for every dollar that it spends' was, in fact,
an express federal goal when the government first adopted the clause." 7
Adoption of a differing site condition provision represents a decision to
de-emphasize the significance of the fixed price in favor of the fair price
concept.
Either the owner or the contractor can ask for an equitable adjustment.
Therefore, the fair price concept can work to either party's advantage
under the federal and standard form provisions. 'O However, an owner's
difficulty in detecting a contractor's cost savings by claiming better-than-
expected site conditions is obvious. While a contractor will assert its
need for upward equitable adjustments, it is unlikely that a contractor will
volunteer that an owner is entitled to such an adjustment downward.
105. See Max W. Strauss, Risk and Liability Sharing: The Owner's View, in I CONSTRUCTION
Risxs, supra note 79, at 28 ("[C]ontractors who having, either deliberately or incompetently
submitted an inadequate bid, attempt[] to compensate by submitting every minor and insignificant
deviation, whether detrimental or beneficial, as a claim for changed conditions.").
106. See Kendall, supra note 95, at 985 (explaining that the federal government's goal is both
to ensure that the contractor is paid for all work and that the government receives work for all money
paid).
107. Id. at 985 & n.65 (quoting Proceedings of the Meetings of the Interdepartmental Board of
Contracts and Adjustments, Washington D.C., 427 Meeting at 2, August 22, 1930).
108. See Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-2(b) (1996) ("If the conditions
do materially so differ and cause an increase or decrease in the Contractor's cost ..., an equitable
adjustment shall be made ...."); AIA DOCUMENT A201, supra note 42, § 4.3.6 ("[Ihf [the
conditions] differ materially and cause an increase or decrease in the Contractor's cost ... , [the
Architect] will recommend an equitable adjustment ...."). See generally T.F. Scholes, Inc. v.
United States, 357 F.2d 963 (Ct. Cl. 1966); McClure, supra note 52.
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Although such adjustments are rarely sought or recovered,' the fair price
principle applies to both parties equally.
b. Prevents Unjust Enrichment
The differing site condition provision merely requires payment for the
work the contractor actually performs. Arguably, an owner is unjustly
enriched under the common law because the owner receives work beyond
that anticipated at the time of making the contract without paying for it.
This argument assumes that the owner initially intended to bargain for a
fair price for work performed at the time of contracting."0 If the owner
desired a fair price, the owner expected neither that the bid price included
work that would not be done (the contingency price) nor that the price
omitted work that would actually be done (work for the differing
condition). To the extent that both parties intended this fair price rather
than the gamble, the opportunistic refusal to modify the contract should
not be rewarded as it is under the common law."' In order to achieve
the fair price principle, contracts must allow mid-performance modifica-
tions as the differing site condition clause demands.
However, the common law view is not that the extra work represents
an unfair benefit to the owner; rather, the common law views the fixed
price as a risk allocation device. The contractor voluntarily assumed the
risk of extra work. The common law assumes that in a fixed-price
contract the owner desired and bargained for the fixed price rather than
a fair price. Thus, under the common law, the owner is not unjustly
enriched and the contractor generally is not entitled to quantum meruit
price adjustment."' However, one author suggests that contractors tend
109. See, e.g., KECO Indus., Inc. v. United States, 364 F.2d 838, 850 (Ct. Cl. 1966); see also
Mason, supra note 52, at 20 ("In practice, the owner can seldom negotiate a contract price change
based on the contention that the site condition made the work less expensive than contemplated by
either party.").
110.
It is not unreasonable to posit an unarticulated "duty to adjust," an obligation on the part
of one party not only to act in good faith, but also to agree to an adjustment of the con-
tract terms in order to avoid any fortuitous advantage at the expense of the other party.
Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searchingfor "the
Wisdom of Solomon," 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1129 (1987).
Ill. See Strauss, supra note 105, at 28; see also Max E. Greenberg, ContractualArrangements,
in 2 CONSTRUCION RisKs, supra note 79, at 100, 104 ("The Owner - not the Contractor, in
estimating his probable costs should include a substantial percentage to cover the risks of
uncertainties. This should be reflected in the appropriation. It is better for the Owner to do it
initially instead of paying it as a hidden cost in the contract price with increased costs of litigation
if the contractor finds his contingency item inadequate. If done properly, contractors' bids will be
well below the appropriation. Funds will then be readily available to satisfy claims for those risks
actually realized.").
112. See American Demolition, Inc. v. Hapeville Hotel Ltd. Partnership, 413 S.E.2d 749, 752
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to undervalue contingency risks."' If this is so, then in a common law
governed contract, the owner arguably does not pay a sufficient sum for
the favorable risk allocation and is unfairly rewarded by the initial
undervaluation of the risk.
c. The Ability to Equitably Adjust the Contract Protects Long-Term
Relationships
The government's interest in maintaining a healthy pool of qualified
bidders includes not only its economic interest in protecting potential
bidders, but also the government's national interests." 4 The clause
protects the financial well-being of the government's pool of bidders and
business partners, and recognizes the mutual benefit gained from the
contractor's continued existence."' When contractors and owners share
an interest in a continued relationship, in the other's continued ability to
perform, or in the continued availability of certain services, then
protecting contractors from losses that threaten their continued existence
serves the long-term interests of both." 6
d. The Differing Site Condition Provision Allocates Risks to One
with More Knowledge
While the differing site condition provision is intended for claims in
which neither party knew nor should have reasonably expected such a
(Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (holding no recovery in quantum meruit for risks associated with subsurface
conditions in demolition contract at common law); S & M Constructors, Inc. v. City of Columbus,
434 N.E.2d 1349, 1351 (Ohio 1982) (holding no recovery of compensation on the ground of unjust
enrichment for that which was agreed should be given in return). But see W.F. Magann Corp. v.
Diamond Mfg. Co., 580 F. Supp. 1299, 1315 (D.S.C. 1984) (holding that subcontractor may recover
quantum meruit damages for unexpected site conditions), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 775 F.2d
1202, 1208 (4th Cir. 1985); Steinberg v. Fleischer, 706 S.W.2d 901, 906-07 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(permitting recovery in quantum meruit).
113. See Lee, supra note 9, at 1100 ("Mhe dynamics of public competitive bidding make
shedding of risk that is out of the contractor's control inherently unfair because it is a non-negotiable
term that the contractor is coerced into undervaluing.").
114. See id. at 1091 (discussing how public contracts serve multiple purposes, including:
constructing infrastructure as a means of encouraging private sector growth, stimulating the economy,
creating jobs, fostering social and economic goals, and promoting small businesses, minority
businesses, and local manufacturing).
115. See Raymond E. Levitt et al., Allocating Risk and Incentive in Construction, 106 J.
CONSTR. Div., Sept. 1980, at 297, 297-98 (noting U. S. Department of Transportation concern that
costs of underground projects (subways, water tunnels, and other underground facilities) preclude the
viability of underground transportation due to misallocation of risks); see also Lee, supra note 9, at
1092.
116. See Scott, supra note 85, at 2007 (noting that the commercial contract goal is to distribute
risk "in the least burdensome way," then "to adjust initial risk assignments in light of subsequent
events so as to realize greater benefits from their joint enterprise").
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condition to exist,"7 the government or large owner usually has substan-
tial knowledge or the ability to acquire such knowledge" ' about the
nature of the latent conditions and the risks involved at the site." 9
Furthermore, the large public or private owner has more ability and time
to conduct site exploration and investigation than does a contractor who
must confine its inspection to a brief pre-bid period. The sophisticated
owner, aware of the retained risk of subsurface or latent conditions and
able to investigate, then makes a conscious decision as to the extent of
investigation desired versus the amount of tolerable risk of unforeseen
conditions.' With knowledge of the potential risks, an owner is able to
budget for contingencies just as the contractor did at common law.
Moreover, the overall business costs are lower when site inspection is
assigned to the owner rather than duplicatively assigned to each potential
bidder.
Furthermore, the clause actually encourages the owner with knowledge
about latent site conditions to share that information with contractors
during the bid phase in order to secure accurate bids.' On the other
hand, the common law gives owners little incentive for candor concerning
the site, because absent misrepresentations the owner is rewarded by a
contractor's optimistically low bid.
117. See supra note 52 for the difference between Type I and Type 11 differing site condition
claims.
118. See Youngdale & Sons Constr. Co. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 527 n.21 (1993)
("Tlhe government is in a better position to provide the contractor with the necessary information
about site conditions ...."); Foster Constr. C.A. & Williams Bros. Co. v. United States, 435 F.2d
873, 881 (Ct. CI. 1970). But see Watkins & Son, Inc. v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591, 592 (N.H. 1941)
(holding that at common law, the contractor "was unwise in taking chances").
119.
Differing-site-condition and changed-condition provisions were instituted in government
contracts to avoid the uneconomic bidding practices which preceded them. The traditional
practice of "all risk" bidding compelled the contractor to include contingencies to cover
unforeseen conditions in every bid. The practice has now given way to more sensible
clauses designed to shift this risk of the unknown to the owner. Therefore, the owner has
a very great practical motivation to assure that he has taken reasonable steps to assemble
and fully disclose all relevant information ....
STEIN, supra note 84, 5.07, at 5-273.
120. See Norman A. Nadel, Allocation of Risks-A Contractor's View, in I CONSTRUCTION
RISKS, supra note 79, at 61, 62-63.
121. See STEIN, supra note 84, 5.07, at 5-273 ("[O]wner has a very great practical motivation
to assure that he has taken reasonable steps to assemble and fully disclose all relevant information.").
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C. A Delicate Balance: The Potential for Abusing the Bidding
Process and Efforts at Reform
1. Disadvantages of the Provision Outside of the Federal Arena
If contractors underbid contracts, anticipating that they can make up
their losses on claims, then three problems occur. First, the owner pays
more than initially budgeted for the work and suffers the resulting
problems related to unexpected and unbudgeted expenses. Second, the
most deserving contractors, those who abide by ethical tenets while
bidding and submit the fairest and most accurate bids, are rejected while
the least ethical bidders are rewarded.' Thus, the entire bidding process
is undermined. Finally, the transaction costs of the claims process further
increases the cost of additional work.'23 The more "flexible" the contract,
the more opportunities to recover compensation despite an initial,
unrealistically low bid.
The federal government is able to balance these risks for three reasons:
1) an elaborate claims process, 24 2) its ability to bear the costs of
monitoring and resisting claims, and 3) because contractors are willing to
treat the federal government fairly in order to preserve their long-term
relationships with the government. However, other owners do not share
the interests or resources of the federal government and may find the
goals of the differing site provision irrelevant to them and its manage-
ment burdens too great. Small owners have little or no interest in long-
term relationships with contractors. Small owners also lack any desire to
protect the contractor or the construction industry.'25 Furthermore, unlike
122. See Wiechman Eng'rs v. State ex rel. Dep't of Public Works, 107 Cal. Rptr. 529, 536 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1973) (noting that this situation is "grossly unfair to the prudent and careful contractor who
is frequently underbid by a careless competitor"). But see Lee, supra note 9, at 1100-01 (arguing
no contingency should be assigned to a contractor in a public contract because inclusion encourages
undervaluing risk: "The contractor who undervalues or ignores such risk is rewarded because it
reflects in a lower bid price."). On the other hand, this Article argues that a liberal claims policy
encourages the same undervaluation and rewards the same inaccurate bidder. Cf Jon D. Markman,
No Light at End of the Tunnel, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at B-I (recounting why contractor's
history of filing claims); Ted Rohrlich, Competing Interests Building a Subway--It Isn't Boring
Series, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1987, at I (discussing how contractors file claims "[a]nytime something
costs.., more than he thought it would;" "nearly every major construction project leads to claims
and litigation").
123. See P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 531 A.2d 1330, 1341 (N.J.
1987) ("[Ihe State argued that it 'would rather pay up front than through litigation' in order to
ensure better budget predictions and public confidence in government spending. But once a policy
choice in bidding is made, it should be respected.").
124. See Vom Baur, supra note 8, at 159 (noting and comparing the sophistication of the federal
claims process with that of most state and municipal governments); see also Baker, supra note 8, at
270 (discussing how some states are developing contract dispute courts akin to the federal system).
125. See Scott, supra note 85, at 2048 ("The mere anticipation of mutually rewarding future
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the federal government, other owners lack an elaborate contract claims
procedure and other policing mechanisms. 126 An owner resisting claims
for equitable adjustments because of alleged differing site conditions
under the current system must be vigilant against contractors that make
claims for ordinary or expected conditions that should have been included
in a proper bid. To ensure the clause functions as intended, an owner
must be prepared to litigate improper claims. 2 7 Monitoring the contract
and the claims process produces attendant transaction costs that add even
more to the cost of projects.
2. A Modest Proposal: Risk-Sharing by Eliminating the Contractor's
Recovery of Profit
The federal and standard form provisions, in totality, share the risks
associated with construction projects by allocating risks to one or another
party so that the overall contract becomes a model of risk sharing. 2 '
However, in the case of unforeseen circumstances, a fairer starting point
for the contract clause might be risk sharing rather than risk allocation.' 29
Neither the common law, assigning the risk to the contractor, nor the
standard provisions, assigning the risk to the owner, share risks of
unforeseen conditions between the parties. If the clause were modified
to provide contractors with protection from the losses associated with a
differing site condition but prevent contractors from realizing a fortuitous
transactions maintains the cooperative equilibrium .... "); see also Sweet, Dominant Actor, supra
note 78, at 329 (stating that AIA claims procedures are less "workable" on small and mid-size
projects).
126. Although required to incorporate federal provisions in grants-in-aid contracts, the federal
courts do not have jurisdiction over contract disputes between the private parties. See Baker, supra
note 8, at 285-86 (citing cases).
127. See Rohrlich, supra note 122, at I ("'Anytime something costs (a contractor) more than
he thought it would, it's only human nature for him to assume it was a changed condition,' remarked
John Fondahl, head of Stanford University's construction engineering and management program.
'Otherwise he would have recognized it when he bid the job').
128. To the extent that the extra-contract and long-term values motivate selection of a differing
site condition provision, risk sharing is also an appropriate contract goal. See MacNeil, Adjustment
of Long-Term Relationships, supra note 100, at 900-01; see also Scott, supra note 85, at 2018
("Risk-sharing arrangements should be preferred where the contingencies are too interactive to make
such individual precautions meaningful."); Sweet, Dominant Actor, supra note 78, at 329-30 (stating
that contracts should "place risk upon the participant who can most easily prevent harm or transfer
risk to others;" however "drafting principles of the AIA do not, in my view, sufficiently stress
management goals of efficiency and harm avoidance").
129. See Ian R. MacNeil, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRAC-
TUAL RELATIONS 27-28 (1980); see also MacNeil, Adjustment of Long-Term Relations, supra note
100; Narasimhan, supra note 26, at 1198 (proposing a model of shared losses for unallocated risks
and noting a disincentive to litigate). See generally Halpern, supra note 110; Robert Hillman,
Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99 (1990).
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profit as a result of the unexpected condition, then the risks would be
shared (admittedly unequally) between the-owner and contractor. 130
While recovery of profit is logically justified for ordered changes and
even perhaps for Type I differing site conditions,' 3' there is no logical
reason to include profit when neither party anticipated the condition. By
eliminating recovery for any profit on differing site condition work,
especially of the Type II kind, 32 the contractor gives up the benefit it
receives for an unforeseen condition (the profit) without suffering a loss,
while the owner pays the costs of the unexpected condition without
rewarding the contractor. Thus, both parties bear part of the financial
risk of the unforeseen condition. While courts seldom arrive at the
sharing solution independently and it is unlikely the common law will
move toward risk sharing,133 express risk-sharing provisions are appropri-
ate in long-term relational contracts and contracts in which parties expect
130. Although not stated expressly, equitable adjustments include recovery for reasonable profit.
See Youngdale & Sons Constr. Co. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 558 (1993) (holding that while
federal regulation does not specifically provide for it, following prior case law, the plaintiff was
"entitled to profit on its differing site condition equitable adjustment claim"); Servidone, 19 Cl. Ct.
at 386 (stating that a "reasonable profit on additional costs allowed in connection with equitable
adjustment"); McClure, supra note 52, at 174 ("The cost adjustment will be reasonable costs incurred
to perform the differing work, plus profit ...."). An example of excluding profits already exists
within the federal regulations. The Suspension of Work provision allows contractors to recover costs
during work suspensions but not lost profits. Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 52.242-14
(1996) ('[A]n adjustment shall be made for any increase in the cost of performance of this contract
(excluding profit) necessarily caused by the unreasonable suspension, delay, or interruption .... ).
131. A Type I claim depends upon proof of misleading information in the owner's contract
documents. See supra note 52. On the other hand, a Type II claim is based upon conditions that
neither party expected nor reasonably anticipated. See supra note 52. Thus, while no showing of
fault is required on a Type I claim, owner misrepresentation may exist in a Type I claim.
Misrepresentation is never a Type 11 issue. See Foster Constr. C.A. & Williams Bros. Co. v. United
States, 435 F.2d 873, 881-82 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
132. See supra note 52.
133. There have been a few, notable decisions that opt for a shared-risk rule. These usually are
in the context of contracts in which the parties shared a long relationship or mutual dependency. See,
e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (providing
equitable price adjustment where production cost index fails to account for dramatic increase in
energy costs during a 17-year contract to convert aluminum ore into ingots); Dynalectron Corp. v.
United States, 518 F.2d 594 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (adopting formula of shared costs in a joint venture failing
for impossibility); National Presto Indus. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, II1 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (the
government contracted to purchase ammunition, neither party had special knowledge that the new
production method called for in the contract would not work as anticipated, and holding that the addi-
tional costs should be borne equally by the government and the contractor. "It is at least equally
logical and decidedly more just to divide the cost between the two parties, neither of whom can be
properly charged with the whole."); McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1984)
(Harshbarger, J., concurring) (seeking reformation of a 75-year mineral lease that was no longer
commercially reasonable). See also Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under
Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 369 (1981).
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sustained, cooperative efforts.'34  In construction contracts, if the
conditions were unforeseen, then there is no particular reason to allocate
the entire risk to either party.
A risk-sharing clause may cure other problems fostered by either the
common law or the differing site risk allocation approach.' Unlike
either the common law or the differing site provision approach, with a
risk-sharing approach each party bears sufficient risk to motivate
responsible conduct during the bid process. Under the common law
approach, the owner was rewarded for withholding information about the
site in hope that an ignorant contractor would bid optimistically low.
Unlike the common law approach, a risk-sharing approach gives the
owner incentive to provide the contractor with information and to desire
an accurate rather than an optimistically low bid. The unbid costs will
eventually fall to the owner along with attendant transaction costs of the
claims process. Under the current differing site condition provision, the
contractor has an incentive to bid optimistically low and take the chance
that equitable adjustments over the course of performance will make up
any shortfall. At least then the contractor is in the game, and the
flexibility of the contract will provide opportunities to recover any
deficiencies in the initial bid. Unlike the current differing site condition
provision approach, in a risk-sharing approach the contractor has an
incentive to bid accurately rather than hope to recover through the claims
process. Only by doing so will the contractor be fully compensated.
A risk-sharing approach also reduces the winner-take-all stakes of
either the common law or the differing site condition provision and
therefore should reduce litigation.'36 However, by eliminating only profit
from the contractor's recovery under an equitable adjustment, the
134. See generally Richard Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & CoM. 193 (1982).
135. One author asserts that public work contracts are adhesionary and unfair to contractors as
now written. The author argues that the government "should pay for all contingent conditions when
and if they are encountered" or insure against the risk rather than pass it on to the contractor. See
Lee, supra note 9, at 1118, 112 1. However, the provisions found in both federal and AIA documents
are typically considered negotiated because of the input from various groups at the drafting stage.
Justin Sweet, on the other hand, notes that while AlA documents are regarded as negotiated contracts,
the owners have been absent from the drafting of these provisions. See Sweet, Dominant Actors,
supra note 78, at 322. Sweet suggests that risks are not well-allocated by the standard provisions
and that owners "basically have been unrepresented in the AIA drafting process." Id.
136. See Steven McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44
HASTINGS W. 1, 26-28 (1992) (discussing why high stakes in litigation disfavor early settlement);
Bruce L. Hay, Fee Awards and Optimal Deterrence, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 505, 514 (1995) (noting
that high stakes discourage settlement); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers
to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REv. 107 (1994) (discussing
psychological and economic impediments to settlement); Edward Yorio, Federal Income Tax
Rulemaking: An Economic Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1982) (discussing how the
all-or-nothing approach reduces likelihood of settlement).
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contractor remains protected from inordinate losses. Thus, the risk-
sharing model continues to recognize the public owner's inherent ability
to better absorb substantial losses (or terminate for convenience), its
interests in protecting the contractor and the construction industry
generally, and its desire to ensure that the contractor is fairly paid for the
work performed. Finally, a risk-sharing approach is consistent with the
overall goals of construction contract provisions, which were designed to
encourage cooperation between parties. 37
Currently, the Model Procurement Code for State and Local Govern-
ments retains a differing site condition provision, '38 although state and
local governments are not uniformly satisfied with the risk allocation. 9
Another alternative for state and local governments is to provide contract
choice at the time bids are solicited.' * The State of Hawaii, as part of
a complete procurement law overhaul, provides alternative provisions
selected by the state when putting the project out for bid. 4 ' One
alternative is modeled after the federal differing site condition provi-
sion." The second, like the common law, leaves the risk of unforeseen
conditions on the contractor.4 3 The election requirement ensures that the
term will be consciously considered as a factor in pricing and permits the
state to elect whether to pay up front in the form of higher bids or at the
end through the claims process."" The election of one provision instead
of another, however, will continue to wholly allocate risks to one or the
other party. ' The election of one alternative in a particular contract may
137. See supra note 101.
138. See Vom Baur, supra note 8, at 169.
139. See City of Morton v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 437 N.W.2d 741, 748 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989) (discussing that municipalities unsuccessfully challenged the validity of a state rule
imposing a two percent limit on grant amendments for increased costs due to differing site conditions
where the state disburses federal grant monies to municipalities); see also SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS,
supra note 104, § 25.04, at 542 ("[M]ost private and many state and local public owners make infor-
mation available to the bidders but use contractual disclaimers in an attempt to relieve themselves
from any responsibility for the accuracy of the information."); John E. Beard III, Contract Allocation
of Risk of Differing Site Conditions, in CLAIMS, supra note 80, at 32 (stating that many states and
many municipalities avoid the clause if possible).
140. When not forced to include a provision by federal law, local governments often exclude
the differing site condition provision. See Beard, supra note 139, at 32.
141. HAWAII ADMIN. RULES § 3-125-11 (Nov. 7, 1995).
142. See id. § 3-125-11(1).
143. See id. § 3-125-11(2).
144. Cf P.T. & L. Constr. v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 531 A.2d 1330, 1341 (N.J. 1987)
("State argued that it 'would rather pay up front than through litigation' in order to ensure better
budget predictions and public confidence in government spending.").
145. The alternative to the federal provision is as follows:
The contractor accepts the conditions at the construction site as they eventually may be
found to exist and warrants and represents that the contract can and will be performed
under such conditions, and that all materials, equipment, labor, and other facilities re-
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indicate which party is in a weaker position, rather than which party
should properly bear the risk under the circumstances."" Thus, election
between alternatives permits the owner to achieve the fixed price desired
if that is paramount, but it solves little else.
IV. SHOULD THE SMALL OWNER PAY MORE TO AVOID THE RISK?
In the single construction transaction, particularly for the small owner
or municipality with limited resources and infrequent construction pro-
jects, the differing site condition provision merely reallocates an
unavoidable risk inherent in the construction contract." 7 The small owner
shares few interests with the federal government in protecting relation-
ships with contractors and industries.4 The owner likely places more
importance on the fixed price of a contract,'49 because the owner is less
able than a large entity to bear unexpected costs. 5 Therefore, the owner
who builds a single project should ask who should bear the cost of an
unforeseen condition, rather than presume to enjoy any of the cost-saving
quired because of any unforeseen conditions (physical or otherwise) shall be wholly at the
contractor's own cost and expense, anything in this contract to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.
HAWAII ADMI. RULES § 3-125-11(2); see also Sweet, Dominant Actor, supra note 78, at 335-36
(noting that AIA documents should provide alternative risk-allocation clauses within its contracts).
146. The National Association of Attorneys General proposed a differing site condition that was
more favorable to the owner. It met with resistance. See Ellickson, supra note 79, at 2.
147. Treatment of risks falls into four categories: risk avoidance, risk abatement, risk retention,
and risk transfer. See Mason, supra note 52, at 26. With a differing site condition provision, the
own"er both retains and transfers certain risks. Costs for reasonably anticipated conditions are
transferred to the contractor and costs for unforeseen conditions are retained by the owner.
148. Cf MacNeil, Adjustment of Long-Term Relations, supra note 100, at 861, 864 (discussing
that current contracts employ risk-shifting, not risk-sharing, provisions).
149. As Sweet explains:
Certainly, cogent arguments can be made for the flexible approach. However, some
owners would prefer a tight contract. If they can afford it, experienced private owners
or public entities will draft their own contracts. They want a "tight" contract that will
protect the contract price and time commitment.... Such owners will "tighten" their
contracts for construction services by making the contractor bear the risk of unforeseen
subsurface conditions .... AlA documents will not do this.
I do not suggest that the AIA's decision to publish flexible contracts is wrong. Yet
the use by some owners-particularly experienced private or public entities-of tight
contracts suggests that the market consists of a variety of customers, some of whom may
wish a tight contract. While the AIA does recognize the value of fixed-price versus cost-
type pricing, it does not publish a document that will meet the needs of an owner who
wishes a tight fixed price contract for design or construction services.
Sweet, Dominant Actor, supra note 78, at 333 (footnotes omitted).
150. Cf id. at 332 ("Clearly, any client believing that the basic fee will be all [he or] she will
pay will be disappointed. The flexible nature of [AIA contract forms] offers much opportunity for
adjustment. However, most adjustments will result in higher fees than the basic fee specified.").
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effects the federal government anticipates from the provision.'"' The
construction industry's decision to include a differing site condition
provision in its standard form contracts merely reflects a decision to
reassign the contractor's common law gamble to the owner.'52
Importantly, although the clause shifts two significant common law
rules that favored the owner, courts have generally held that AIA
documents and other standardized construction contracts are "negotiated
contracts" and interpret the contracts' clauses neutrally and not as
adhesionary.' However, small owners, unlike the federal government
151. See Levitt, supra note 115, at 297 ("Proper allocation of risk must consider ... [the]
ability to absorb risk and incentive to manage risk, as well as the particular characteristics of the
construction project contemplated."); Raymond E. Levitt et al., Impact of Owner-Engineer Risk
Sharing on Design Conservatism, I10 J. PROF. ISSUES ENG'G, 157, 157 (1984); Justin Sweet,
Standard Construction Contracts: Some Advice to Construction Layers, 40 S.C. L. REV. 823, 828-
29 (1989) [hereinafter Sweet, Advice to Construction Lawyers].
152. "Such clauses, which have long been staples of federal contracts, are intended 'to prevent
bidders from increasing their bid prices to protect against misfortunes resulting from unforeseen
developments, and thus avoid turning a construction contract into a 'gambling transaction."'
Municipality of Anchorage v. Frank Coluccio Constr. Co., 826 P.2d 316, 318 (Alaska 1992) (citing
J.F. Shea Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 46, 50 (1983), affd, 754 F.2d 338 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see
also Sweet, Advice to Construction Lawyers, supra note 151, at 829.
153. See SWEET, supra note 52, §§ 3.3-3.4, at 22-29; Sweet, Dominant Actor, supra note 78,
at 324. AIA describes its drafting process as one of negotiations on an industry-wide basis:
Among all [the standard form] publishers, the American Institute of Architects (AIA)
has probably the most refined and time-tested drafting process. It was in 1870 at its
annual convention that the members of the AIA decided to establish a committee assisted
by legal counsel for the drafting of contract forms. Today, the AIA still drafts its forms
by committee, but even in its early efforts the AIA attempted to involve other groups.
Over time the AlA has evolved a slow, cumbersome and expensive drafting process,
but one that is necessary if it is to achieve a fair and durable balance among all the
significant interests affected by the particular contract form. Generally, each AIA form
is on a ten-year revision cycle ....
An important element of this committee process is having participants who, although
surrogates for the eventual users of the forms, have close similarity to the users in
background and outlook. First, AIA's Documents Committee is composed of practicing
architects who have been appointed based upon their regional diversity and variety of
practices. Next, the AIA opens the drafting process by soliciting and receiving comments
from any and all interested parties. Comments are especially solicited from other
organizations whose membership is composed of people with a special interest in the
subject matter. Generally, the AIA prefers that representatives from those organizations
be taken from the constituency-that they be actual owners, engineers, general contractors,
subcontractors, sureties, and lawyers. Even though these individuals may be surrogates
for the groups they represent, the closer they are to the actual experiences of their
constituencies the more realistic their value judgments will be....
The purpose of this process is to obtain an industry consensus on the standard forms
before they are published. Each participant in this process will have to make trade-offs
since nobody's self interest will exist in pure form; in this process it must exist in
relationship to others' interests, and that is where the balancing comes in. In the end, it
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that presents a take-it-or-leave-it contract to contractors, hardly enjoy the
same, superior position as the federal government at the time parties enter
a contract. 54 Furthermore, small owners have been the least represented
group in drafting the standard form contracts.'" Because the clause so
dramatically shifts the expected, common law result, it may catch a small
owner by surprise. However, its absence in the contract would not
disadvantage either sophisticated contractors or owners.5 6  Obviously,
sophisticated parties draft their own provisions or, at the very least,
acquaint themselves with the effects of standard provisions.5 7 The
standard form contract documents should reflect terms favorable to the
least knowledgeable party in order to promote discussion and negotiation
by one with knowledge.' 8
On occasion, the differing site condition provision may be appropriate
and desirable even for small owners. It gives some advantages to the
small owner. When those advantages are important, the parties should
include the provision. The clause encourages contractors to bid a fair
price without building in the risk of contingencies and allows owners
recovery for unexpectedly favorable conditions. For owners willing to
take the risk and for whom the fixed price is less important, the provision
will not be a matter of getting everything you want but of getting the things you really
need.
Ellickson, supra note 79, at 2-3.
154.
A primary difference between government contracts and commercial contracts is the
absence of real negotiation. The contractor may either accept the contract with all its
boilerplate or leave it. There is no give and take nor any 'meeting of the minds' as to the
inclusion or the meaning of exculpatory language.
Kendall, supra note 95, at 987 (citations omitted).
155. "Even though the AIA, AGC [Associated General Contractors of America] and EJCDC take
great pains to involve owners in the development of their contracts, the owner community is virtually
nonexistent during the negotiations." McAlpine & Breuch, supra note R, at 558; see also Sweet,
Dominant Actor, supra note 78, at 322 (noting the "conspicuous absence of owners or groups with
the owner's interests in mind" from the AIA document creation process).
156. See Sweet, Dominant Actor, supra note 78, at 332 (stating that experienced owners draft
their own contracts).
157. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice
of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 746 (1991) ([Wlhen contracting is costless and parties have
common knowledge of the default rule, the choice of default rules will have no impact on either the
equilibrium of contractual obligations or social welfare.").
158. See id. at 761; Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 895 (1992) ("IThe law should adopt a conventionalist default rule
reflecting the commonsense understanding of the community to which the rationally ignorant party
belongs. If this term is objectionable to the knowledgeable party, it will then explicitly contract
around the default rule, and the process . . . will call the new rule to the attention of the rationally
ignorant party ...."); Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. Pin. L. REv. 75, 125
(1984) (noting that courts should adopt default rules that favor the ignorant party).
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should be included. However, typically, the small owner probably does
not expect a refund when agreeing to a fixed-fee contract, recognizing the
firmness of the fixed-fee agreement on both sides. As with other
consumer purchases, the owner likely expects the contractor will make a
profit, does not expect a refund, and does not care whether the profit is
large or small so long as the fixed fee represents a competitive price.
Moreover, without a differing site condition provision in the contract, the
contractor is forced to reveal potential latent and subsurface conditions
that it suspects may exist in order to justify its inclusion of a contingency
in the bid. Equipped with that information, the owner may elect to
absorb the known risk if the contractor is able to give the owner the
parameters of that risk.
However, without extra-contract justifications to warrant its inclusion,
small owners benefit least from the positive effects of the differing site
condition provision. Moreover, the negative effects of the mischievous
clause are exacerbated by the relative inequality of risk-bearing ability,
bargaining power, and knowledge. While the basic contract assumption
for the government and larger entities--honest work for a fair price--may
be prime, for the individual owner the basic contract assumption is more
likely honest work for a fixed price. Unlike large owners, with long-term
relationship concerns and extra-contractual concerns, the individual more
likely desires a contract reflecting discrete transaction goals. "'
Finally, if the potential for harm is considered, the advantage of
protecting the contractor instead of the large public owner is reasonable
159. Cf MacNeil, Adjustment of Long-Term Relationships, supra note 100, at 856. MacNeil
distinguishes discrete and relational contracts in terms of differing fundamental values. These
differing values are well-reflected in contracting parties' choice between the common law and the
differing site condition provision. For example, MacNeil explains that discrete relationships value
presentiation (perceiving, defining, and limiting the effect of the future) over uncertainty. Id. at 863.
Discrete contracting commodifies the subject matter and in doing so limits the relationship to the
substantive content of the agreement. Id. Discrete contracting strives for completeness. Id. On the
other hand, relational contracts value future cooperation, flexibility, harmonizing conflicts internally,
and preserving the relationship even in changing circumstances. Id. at 889-92.
In the case of a differing site condition, the common law treatment attempts to achieve "discrete"
contract goals despite the long and uncertain path a construction project takes. The common law
assumes that the contractor and owner considered the risk of unforeseen conditions and, through fixed
pricing, allocated those risks to the contractor. Thus, the common law avoids uncertainty by
assuming the completeness of the contract and through risk allocation. Moreover, the pre-existing
duty rule favors certainty over flexibility.
The differing site condition clause, on the other hand, acknowledges relational contract values and
attempts to facilitate a working relationship between the owner and the contractor. In so doing, the
clause sacrifices the certainty of a fixed price. The owner and contractor are given a method to
modify the contract to accommodate a changed condition rather than fixing both the price and the
risk allocation at the time of contracting. Despite the adversity of changed circumstances, the clause
requires the parties to continue the working relationship and to resolve their disputes. Importantly,
employing the clause also serves relational values that are external to the contract.
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in terms of the large public owner's ability to absorb the unexpected loss
on a single project more easily than can the contractor."' ° Yet, just the
opposite is true for smaller public entities and individuals. 6'
The small owner, including municipalities with shallower pockets than
the federal government, is more likely to value the certainty of a fixed-
price contract even if it means it may pay for a bid inflated by the risk
of unforeseen contingencies. Additionally, small owners, unlike the large
owners, typically lack the knowledge necessary to make informed
160. The following illustration demonstrates that because the harm, rather than the cost, may
be less severe, risk is typically better borne by the deeper pocket:
Utility theory suggests that risk sharing should not be done on the basis of expected
monetary value. If risks were allocated between a large owner such as the Federal
Government and a contractor on an expected monetary value basis, it should make no
difference in expected costs whether the owner or the con actor assumed the risk. For
instance, assume there is a probability of 0.1 that a flood will occur and cause $1,000,000
in damage to a construction project despite any possible precautions. On the basis of
expected monetary value, it should make no difference whether the contractor or the
owner assumed this risk; if the contractor assumed the risk, he would charge the owner
0.1 x $1,000,000 or $100,000 to cover the risk, while if the owner assumed the risk, he
would similarly add $100,000 to the expected cost of the project. The consequences if
the flood did occur, however, could be quite different in the two cases. If the contractor
had assumed the risk, the additional cost of $900,000 above the expected $100,000 might
be a catastrophic loss resulting in bankruptcy or at least seriously impairing the
contractor's ability to operate. The effects on the owner (the Federal Government) if it
had assumed the risk would not be nearly so serious.
Because of the possibility of catastrophic loss, contractors do not appear willing to
assume large risks on the basis of expected monetary value. They tend to include a
sufficient contingency above and beyond the expected value of the loss so that even if the
loss occurs the cost will not be catastrophic. For example, assume that the contractor
could withstand a $200,000 flood loss but that a $300,000 loss would put him out of
business. He might then be unwilling to assume the risk for less than $800,000, thus
limiting his maximum loss to $200,000. In other words, the contractor in this case has
a preference for particular dollar outcomes which is not in proportion to their dollar
amounts. To reflect this risk aversion preference, utility theory assigns utility values to
various dollar amounts by analyzing the decision-maker's preference for outcomes in a
series of simple uncertainty lotteries. Whereas the contractor might have gone bankrupt
in the short run if a flood occurred, a large owner might be better able to sustain a large
loss on a particular project because the losses should average out in the long run over
several projects and approach an expected value. His utility curve may approach that
derived on an expected monetary value basis.
ERIKsON, supra note 90, at 15.
161.
Given a risk that is relatively unforeseeable, relatively uncontrollable, and that unfairly
benefits or detriments the party who must bear it, it is useful to examine the ability of the
respective parties to bear the risk .... A large designer or contractor may, in fact, far
exceed in size and capacity the small owner engaged in a single project such as one rural
schoolhouse.
W. Stell Huie, Identification and Nature of Risks, in 2 CONSTRUCTION RisKs, supra note 79, at 15,
20-21.
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
decisions on the risk. 6" Thus, it is often the contractor, rather than the
small owner, who possesses superior knowledge about potentially adverse
soil conditions, the hardness of rock found in the area, or the depth of the
water table.
Moreover, small owners, unlike the federal government, are not as
well-suited to effectively manage and litigate claims. The differing site
condition provision is only effective when it is not used as a method to
recover costs that should have been built into the contract price initially.
The small owner lacks the ability to police the process and is therefore
more vulnerable to the abuses connected with the provision. Further-
more, the small owner has neither a long-term relationship nor a desire
to foster such a relationship with contractors. Likewise, the contractor
has no long-term relationship to preserve with the small owner. Thus, the
incentive to cooperate in order to promote future relationships is
nonexistent. For these reasons, small owners are likely to prefer true
fixed-price contracts instead of contracts with differing site condition
provisions.
V. CONCLUSION
The differing site condition provision represents a risk allocation tool
that contractors and the federal government contend allocates risk fairly
and results in more precise bidding, fairer pay to the contractor, and
lower costs to the owner in the aggregate. However, the clause generates
disputes between contractors and owners as to whether conditions were
actually unforeseen or should have been anticipated. Its inclusion gives
contractors an opportunity to capture costs that should properly have been
built into the original bid. The inclusion disadvantages careful bidders.
The winner-take-all stakes and the inherent need to diligently police
claims probably contribute to the number of disputes. Attendant costs of
the claims process serve neither contractor nor owner. If the clause were
rewritten to provide for risk sharing, the contractor's incentive to bid
accurately would be maximized. Furthermore, risk sharing would cure
common law risk allocation problems as well, giving owners incentives
to conduct adequate site inspections and provide site information to
bidders. Finally, reducing the stakes and making claim recovery less
rewarding may promote negotiation and settlement.
Small owners should be given the opportunity to return to common law
risk allocation rules if the owner places more value on a fixed price for
work than on a low bid. In order to protect the small owner from this
mischievous clause, at the very least, form contract documents should
provide parties with alternative provisions in order to force negotiation
162. See Narasimhan, supra note 26, at 1147-48 (stating that experience shapes risk assumption).
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on this important and frequently-litigated provision. As the form
documents exist now, small owners will be caught unaware of the
ramifications of this provision.
